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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
uilding Confidence in Peace reports and analyses the results of the first 
in a series of public opinion surveys in Cyprus carried out by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in collaboration with 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot partners. The project, which began in 
late 2007, gained momentum and significance with the 21 March 2008 peace 
process launched by the Greek Cypriot President Demetris Christofias and 
his Turkish Cypriot counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat. Indeed direct 
negotiations on the island, stalled since 2004, were restarted on 3 
September 2008 – a new process that both communities and the 
international community alike appear to acknowledge as possibly the final 
chance for reunification of the island, in view of the changing dynamics 
both within Cyprus, the eastern Mediterranean and the wider international 
community. In this renewed political context, the lessons of the recent past 
are vivid in the minds of both the local leaders and external actors. First, 
lest a new agreement be subject to unjustified accusations of ‘foreign 
meddling’ it is crucial for the peace process to be ‘Cypriot-owned’. This 
does not imply that Cypriots should be left alone. Yet the role of external 
parties – first and foremost the EU – should be that of supporting and 
offering incentives in the peace process as well as acting alongside 
negotiations in order to increase confidence between the two communities, 
both in the peace process and in the EU itself. The second lesson drawn 
from the Annan Plan and the referenda (see Introduction) is the need to 
engage the public in the peace process.  Debate and communication need to 
be established between local leaders and the public so that the peace 
process is as open and participatory as possible.  
It is in this context that CEPS has launched a project investigating, 
through successive opinion polls, what Cypriots think of each other, of the 
peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict. The aim of the 
project and of this book is to act in support of the peace process; exploring 
avenues to increase public confidence in the process and testing ideas for a 
solution that would meet the consent of both communities. The results of 
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our first survey are presented here, conducted simultaneously in the 
northern and southern parts of the island in April-May 2008. We suggest 
ways in which the leaders in Cyprus and the EU could increase public 
confidence in and offer incentives for peace on the island.  
We begin our study by exploring who the Cypriots are and what 
their political values and attitudes are. How do Cypriots view themselves? 
What are their aspirations, their fears and their perceptions of each other, 
and of the prospects for peace on the island? The picture that emerges is a 
mixed one. On the one hand, Cypriots share, as citizens, many important 
similarities in terms of their political values and aspirations, with 
differences between them appearing to be rooted more in their different 
contexts and historical trajectories than in fundamental divergences in 
values and ideologies. Moreover, while some reasons for concern do 
emerge, Cypriots are open to compromise, are ready to revisit their official 
historical narratives and abhor a resort to violence. This sets Cyprus apart 
from other conflicts in the European neighbourhood, as the August 2008 
war between Russia and Georgia tragically reminds us. On the other hand, 
Cypriots are fundamentally distrustful. Turkish Cypriots distrust Greek 
Cypriots, the EU and the international community, whereas Greek Cypriots 
distrust Turkey. Mistrust is also intra-communal, with general and diffuse 
mistrust of fellow citizens and institutions. Moreover, both communities 
lack confidence in the peace process; after decades of failed negotiations, 
Cypriots view renewed efforts to reach an agreement with caution.  
Turning to views on a comprehensive settlement, we note that 
whereas divergence exists in terms of ‘ideal’ solutions, the second-best area 
of convergence between the two communities remains that of a bi-
communal bi-zonal federation based on the principle of political equality. 
Delving deeper into the substance of a final settlement, we found 
interesting areas of convergence on issues such as Cyprus’ economic and 
international outlook. As expected, divergence is prominent over other 
items on the conflict settlement agenda, yet we also note that agreement 
exists on the procedures and principles to tackle contested issues such as 
governance, rights and freedoms, security and territory. 
On the basis of these results a double need emerges starkly. First, it is 
essential to act, in parallel to the negotiating process, to engender public 
confidence in the peace process, in order to ensure that as and when an 
agreement is reached, the Cypriot people will go along with it and make its 
ratification and implementation a success. Second, precisely because of 
persistent areas of divergence, a set of confidence-building steps could be CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | iii 
 
envisaged to help narrow the gaps separating the two communities. This 
does not entail shifting attention from negotiations to confidence-building 
measures (CBMs), a strategy that has often either had the intent or the 
effect of sinking negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. In contrast, 
unilateral CBMs or non-controversial CBMs oriented towards inter-societal 
reconciliation may have a very positive impact and may add momentum to 
the peace process within a strategic context of renewed negotiations. It is 
precisely in this spirit that we note the ongoing efforts to build confidence 
in parallel to negotiations, first and foremost with the opening of the Ledra 
Street crossing/Lokmacı on 3 April 2008.  
Our survey revealed a first set of CBMs that could be easily agreed 
and implemented in so far as they meet wide support and little resistance 
from both communities. As such these ‘easily-agreed measures’ could be 
pursued alongside negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. More 
specifically, steps could be taken in the areas of: 
•  Jointly fighting organised crime on the island 
•  Joint participation of the two communities in international 
sporting events, drawing upon the formulas devised by other 
countries bedevilled by problems of contested sovereignty and 
recognition  
•  Joint protection of each community’s cultural heritage 
•  Establishing a social reconciliation committee, which will be 
future-oriented and tasked with the building of trust between the 
two communities 
•  Supporting Turkish-Cypriot-EU harmonisation 
•  Renovating and making joint use of buildings in the buffer zone 
near the Ledra Street crossing. 
Alongside this, other confidence-building steps could be taken to 
facilitate negotiations on the more contested issues in the comprehensive 
settlement agenda. In our survey we noted strong convergence on the 
theme that the negotiations should be supplemented by various fact-
finding activities, many of which could be encouraged, supported by or 
organised by the EU in its efforts to support the negotiating process. These 
fact-finding activities include: 
•  Conducting an analysis of threats and threat perceptions, from the 
viewpoint of all actors involved, to serve as a foundation for 
further negotiations around the security issue iv | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
•  Producing an economic development plan for post-settlement 
Cyprus that will instil confidence in the public that a solution will 
bring prosperity to both communities 
•  Conducting an internationally monitored Cyprus-wide census of 
all properties – Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot – affected by 
the conflict in order to assess their current use and condition, as a 
foundation for further negotiations around the property issue 
•  Engaging in consultations with individuals affected by the 
property issue, to identify their preferences and priorities 
regarding the resolution of their property claims 
•  Conducting an internationally-monitored population census, on 
both sides of the Green Line, as a foundation for further 
negotiations around the issues of citizenship and immigration. 
These fact-finding activities would both increase public confidence in 
the peace process – which will be viewed as a result of such efforts as more 
participatory, inclusive and grounded on the needs of the people – and at 
the same time may help bridge the gaps dividing the two communities on 
some of the most contested dossiers of the conflict settlement agenda. 
A second category of CBMs, which we define as more challenging, 
would be those that enjoy narrow majority support in both communities, 
while also meeting resistance from sizeable minorities in either one or both, 
and which would thus require careful packaging and negotiation between 
the two leaders. Yet as in the case of the first set of CBMs, these measures 
could also be pursued alongside the peace process aimed at reaching a 
comprehensive agreement, and would in fact serve to boost this process 
and ease agreement on several items on the conflict settlement agenda. 
Among these measures would be: 
•  Including northern Cyprus in the EU customs union 
•  Including Turkish Cypriot higher education institutions in the 
European higher education system (Bologna, Erasmus etc.), while 
at the same time creating joint academic institutions where Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot academics and students can work 
together 
•  Exploring forms of transitional justice. 
Finally, there are other important yet far more contested CBMs to be 
considered and worked upon. Given the divisive nature of these issues, we 
suggest that they be discussed within both communities in order to prepare 
the ground for future agreement. However, in the current political context, CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | v 
 
they should probably not be the subject of negotiations between the 
leaders. In fact, within a comprehensive agreement, all these issues would 
automatically be resolved. Nevertheless, given their critical importance and 
the uncertainty of any future comprehensive deal, we raise these questions 
here, recommending that at this stage, official, political and civil society 
actors discuss them within each community, before tackling them in inter-
communal discussions at leadership level. These issues include: 
•  Direct trade and direct flights 
•  Resolution of Varosha. 
Our survey revealed that once proposals are re-conceptualised so that 
both communities stand to gain from each measure, then the polarisation 
around these issues that emerges on the surface begins to dissipate. 
Potentially promising approaches to tackle these issues include: 
•  Converting Varosha into a special zone of inter-communal 
cooperation, under the supervision of the UN and the EU, as an 
area where the challenges of power-sharing will be tested in 
advance of a comprehensive settlement 
•  Making an airport available for common use, both by Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to travel to the rest of the world. 
These two proposals could at some point be merged into one 
integrated package, if the proposed common airport is located at, or is very 
close to, the proposed inter-communal zone of Varosha.  
While these issues ought not to be negotiated now, lest they detract 
attention from and contaminate the ongoing peace talks, we felt it 
important to raise them for the sake of ‘contingency-planning’ and to 
increase the stakes and incentives of the current peace talks. 
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1.  Introduction 
The 21 March 2008 process launched by the newly elected Greek Cypriot 
President Demetris Christofias and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart 
Mehmet Ali Talat has injected new hope into the Cyprus peace process. On 
July 25th the leaders produced a joint statement in which they pledged that 
ultimately “[t]he agreed solution will be put to separate simultaneous 
referenda”.1 Fully-fledged negotiations commenced with a formal 
ceremony on 3 September 2008. Hence, whereas external mediators may 
well have to inject ideas and bridge proposals in this renewed peace effort, 
what is clear is that the people of Cyprus and their leaders must be in 
charge of the process for it to have any chance of success.    
With the failed referenda of April 2004, in which the Greek Cypriot 
community rejected and the Turkish Cypriot community accepted the UN-
brokered Annan Plan2 coupled with numerous domestic setbacks, 
particularly in the south, to an effective post-Annan Plan re-engagement, 
Cyprus lived through four years of stalemate. But every cloud has a silver 
lining, and over the course of the last four years several important lessons 
have been learnt by Cypriots and the international community alike.  
The first critical lesson was the need for a Cyprus peace process to be 
Cypriot-owned. True, the Annan Plan had been largely drawn-up by the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and their negotiating teams, 
building upon talks carried out between both sides over decades. The UN 
team had made bridge proposals, suggested new ideas and fixed time 
frames only when compromise eluded the leaders. Yet the mainstream 
narrative within the Greek Cypriot community, which was driven by the 
‘No’ camp, was that the Plan had been imposed upon Cypriots by foreign 
agents. In turn the public perception among Greek Cypriots of the Annan 
Plan process was of excessive external meddling, which reawakened deep-
                                                      
1 UN News Centre (2008), “Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders announce 
‘full-fledged’ negotiations” (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID_ 
27489&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1). 
2 The Annan Plan proposed a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus conflict 
foreseeing the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic with its two 
constituent states in the northern and southern parts of the island. Several 
iterations of the Plan were published between November 2002 and April 2004, 
when the Plan was put to two separate and simultaneous referenda.    2 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
seated anti-colonial sentiments and fears. In other words, regardless of the 
actual truthfulness of this narrative, the fact that it took hold within the 
Greek Cypriot community created a new reality that had to be reckoned 
with. Without necessarily setting aside their first instinctive reaction that 
questioned the Greek Cypriot commitment to any kind of federal solution, 
the international community gradually appreciated this reality and thus 
recognised the need for any future effort to be unambiguously Cypriot-
owned. This would not necessarily provide a guarantee of success, of 
course, but it would hedge against some of the criticisms that had dogged 
the Annan Plan. Hence, in December 2006, the Greek Ambassador to the 
UN Adamantios Th. Vassilakis, argued at the Security Council in favour of 
a “Cypriot-owned solution through a Cypriot-owned process”.3 Echoing 
this line, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his end-of-office 
report stated that “the responsibility [for the peace process] lies primarily 
with the Cypriots themselves”.4 Following the election of Christofias in 
2008, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown pledged full support for a 
“Cypriot-owned solution”.5 The view gradually consolidated both within 
and beyond Cyprus that a new process had to see Cypriots themselves 
squarely in the driver’s seat, determining the substance, procedures and 
timeframes of negotiations. The international community and the UN in 
particular would keep to a good offices role. This does not imply that 
Cypriots should or would be left alone in the process. Particularly in view 
of the asymmetries in power, incentives and contexts in the conflict, but 
also in view of the responsibility shared by external actors for the 2004-2008 
impasse, the EU ought to play an important role here. Yet the role of the EU 
would be that of acting in support of and generating incentives within a 
Cypriot peace process as well as acting alongside the negotiation process in 
order to raise confidence between the two communities, in the peace 
process and in the EU itself, which is the very subject of this report. 
                                                      
3 UN Security Council (2006), “Security Council Extends Mandate in Cyprus Force 
until 15 June 2007, unanimously adopting Resolution 1728(2006)”, Security Council 
Meeting 5593, 15 December (http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 
2006/sc8905.doc.htm). 
4 UN News Centre (2006), “Without a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, Annan 
recommends extending mission” (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=20853&Cr=cyprus&Cr1=). 
5 S. Evripidou (2008), “A new era in relations with Britain”, Cyprus Mail, 9 June. CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 3 
 
The second lesson drawn from the Annan Plan and the referenda is 
the need to engage public opinion in the peace process. In the years since 
the referenda, public opinion polls and studies have shown that, while 
Cypriots certainly do heed the calls of their leaders, they are actors in the 
peace process in and of themselves, with views – more or less informed – 
on what kind of solution they would like to see and accept on the island.6 
Naturally it is far easier for leaders to discuss these matters in secret behind 
closed doors. In some respects secrecy also allows for greater flexibility and 
openness to compromise. Yet the Annan Plan precedent points to the 
boomerang effect of an elite-driven and non-transparent process. Once the 
Plan was disclosed and because its content and philosophy had not been 
discussed in public over time, it became far easier for the ‘No’ camp in the 
south – where the Annan Plan process did not overlap with a period of 
effective regime change, as in the north – to make its case. The need to 
engage public opinion and thus listen, inform and discuss the peace 
process publicly and transparently is thus key to achieving, first, positive 
referenda results, and second, the actual implementation of a peace 
agreement on the ground. It is essential that debate and communication be 
established between local leaders and the public and for the peace process 
to be as open and participatory as possible in order to maximize its chances 
of success. While not being a sufficient condition of success, an open and 
transparent process appears to have become a necessary element of a 
successful process in Cyprus.  
It is in this context that CEPS has launched a project to investigate 
what Cypriots think of each other, of the peace process and of possible 
solutions to the conflict, carried out through successive public opinion 
polls. Within the context of a renewed ‘Cypriot-owned’ peace process at 
elite levels, the relevance of this project has soared. Its aim is to act in 
support of this process, exploring avenues to increase public confidence in 
it and testing ideas for a solution that would meet both communities’ 
consent. In what follows we present the results of our first survey, 
conducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island 
in April-May 2008, and suggest ways in which the leadership in Cyprus as 
                                                      
6 See A. Lordos (2008), “Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Survey-Based 
Profile Analysis of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Referendum Voters”, in T. 
Diez and N. Tocci (eds), Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 4 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
well as in the EU could engage in measures to raise public confidence in as 
well as incentives for peace on the island.7 
The objective of this book is not to delve into the substantive and 
detailed elements of a peace agreement, although preliminary results will 
be presented. This will be the subject of the next phase of the project, the 
results of which will be presented in forthcoming publications. The aim 
here is rather to focus on measures to build confidence both between the 
parties in conflict and, above all, in the peace process itself in view of its 
relaunch in 2008. Building public confidence in the process is indeed a 
fundamental precondition for its ultimate success.  
2.  Inter-communal Values and Attitudes 
We began our study by exploring who the Cypriots are and what their 
political values and attitudes are. How do Cypriots view themselves? What 
are their aspirations, their fears and their perceptions of each other, and the 
prospects for peace on the island? Our initial focus on values and attitudes 
reflects an acknowledgement that a solution in Cyprus must not only focus 
on constitutional and technical matters, but also on sociological factors. 
Efforts to build a viable polity will require an appreciation of the political 
sociology of the respective communities, their points of convergence and of 
divergence.   
The picture that emerges is a mixed one. On the one hand, Cypriots 
share, as citizens, many important similarities in terms of their political 
values and aspirations, with differences between them appearing to be 
rooted more in their different contexts and historical trajectories than to 
fundamental differences in values and ideologies. Moreover, while some 
differences and reasons for concern do emerge, Cypriots are open to 
compromise, ready to revisit their official historical narratives and abhor a 
resort to violence. This sets Cyprus apart from other conflicts in the 
European neighbourhood, as the August 2008 war between Russia and 
                                                      
7 Two identical polls were conducted, in the north and south, by Prologue 
Consulting Ltd. and CYMAR, respectively.  For each poll, 1000 interviews were 
conducted. Respondents were selected initially through stratification of urban and 
rural populations based on census data. Details of the sampling process can be 
found in Annex 1. The questionnaire was produced by CEPS in collaboration with 
a research team comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and has been 
reproduced here in Annex 2. CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 5 
 
Georgia tragically reminds us.8 This very point was made in a recent report 
published by the Cyprus Centre of the International Peace Research 
Institute of Oslo (PRIO) that finds that Cyprus is unique in that, despite 
inter-ethnic warfare, levels of ethnic cleansing and inter-communal hatred 
are lower than might be expected.9  
On the other hand, Cypriots are fundamentally distrustful. Turkish 
Cypriots mistrust Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community, 
whereas Greek Cypriots mistrust Turkey, bringing to the fore the double-
minority characterisation of the conflict.10 Indeed, other recent polls 
conducted point to high levels of inter-communal mistrust.11 It has been 
suggested elsewhere that inter-communal trust can be enhanced through 
greater contact between the communities. Unfortunately, in Cyprus, 
crossings have been limited and even declined after an initial peak in 2003, 
due to a number of factors.12 Mistrust is also intra-communal, with general 
and diffuse mistrust of fellow citizens and institutions.  These findings are 
not unique to this study. The relative weakness of civil society in both 
communities has been documented.13 In response to this reality the 
                                                      
8 There are also groups in Armenia and Azerbaijan that support the resort to 
military means if necessary in order to reach a ‘solution’ to the conflict. On this 
point, see the International Crisis Group (2005), Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the 
Conflict from the Ground, Europe report No. 166, 14 September. 
9 A. Sitas et al. (2007), Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-Existence and Forgiveness in 
Cyprus in the Post-Referendum Period, PRIO Report, Cyprus Centre  of the 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo,  (http://www.prio.no/files/manual-
import/cyprus/1740_Report_4_07.pdf) 
10 This refers to the ‘balance’ created by the fact that Turkish Cypriots are in a 
minority position vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots on the island, whereas Greek Cypriots 
and Greeks are in a minority position vis-à-vis Turkey in the eastern 
Mediterranean.   
11 J. Christou (2008), “Questions raised over poll of Turkish Cypriot attitudes”, 
Cyprus Mail, 12 August. 
12 C. Psaltis (2008), “Trust, contact and identities in the Turkish Cypriot and the 
Greek Cypriot community”, paper presented at the conference on Rethinking 
Reconciliation and Cooperation with View to Reunification in Cyprus: Challenges 
for Citizens, Political and Social Actors, 20-21 June, University of Nicosia. 
13 CIVICUS (2005), “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the 
Future”, CIVICUS: Civil Society Index Report. 6 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
European Union has launched its Cypriot Civil Society in Action 
programme.14 Moreover, both communities lack confidence in the peace 
process; after decades of failed negotiations and the ultimate failure of the 
Annan Plan, Cypriots view renewed efforts to reach an agreement with 
some caution.  
2.1  Shared values and aspirations 
In this section we investigate the degree to which the communities in 
Cyprus share certain values and aspirations that might make a settlement 
feasible or otherwise. As we see below, people from both communities tend 
to exhibit pragmatism, putting a premium on economic and social progress 
while abhorring the use of violence. Alongside this both communities also 
share the view that the status quo is neither preferable to a solution nor 
ideal. Yet at the same time, a high degree of risk aversion within both 
communities, coupled with the significant percentage of Cypriots – higher 
in the Greek Cypriot community – who are satisfied with or have mixed 
feelings about the political status quo, could constitute an obstacle to 
peaceful resolution.   
Beginning with shared values, Cypriots share some important 
similarities regarding their perceived identities and political values. Large 
majorities of each community view themselves as being both 
Greek/Turkish and Cypriot (96% GC and 76% TC), even if both consider 
Greece and Turkey respectively as being their cultural and/or political kin-
states. In other words, Greek and Turkish Cypriots tend not to identify 
themselves as Greeks or Turks exclusively, and both communities share an 
affinity to Cyprus (see Figures 1 & 2).   
Both communities also have an open international outlook, with 63% 
of Greek Cypriots and 66% of Turkish Cypriots identifying with the 
description ‘citizen of the world’. Furthermore, neither community 
manifests an ingrained sense of euroscepticism, with only small minorities 
viewing EU membership as a threat to national identity (19% GC and 22% 
TC). However, whereas 88% of Greek Cypriots view themselves as EU 
citizens, only 41% of Turkish Cypriots do so (see Figure 3).  
                                                      
14 T h i s  p r o g r a m m e  i s  f u n d e d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  f i n a n c i a l  
instrument to support the development of the Turkish Cypriot community through 
budget-line 22020703 (see EuropeAid/127215/L/ACT/CY at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/cgi/frame12.pl). CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 7 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Greek Cypriot sense of identity 
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Figure 2a. Greek Cypriot sense of cultural affinity 
 
 
Figure 2b. Turkish Cypriot sense of cultural affinity 
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Figure 3a. Greek Cypriot sense of citizenship 
 
 
Figure 3b. Turkish Cypriot sense of citizenship 10 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
This divergence is a clear reflection of the Turkish Cypriots’ exclusion 
from many of the benefits of EU membership, rather than a fundamental 
rejection of the EU. Today’s feeling of exclusion from the EU may well, in 
time, translate into Turkish Cypriot euroscepticism, especially in a situation 
of continued turbulence in EU-Turkey relations. Such euroscepticism may 
in turn translate into a more rigid negotiating position vis-à-vis the conflict. 
This could be true especially of those aspects of a settlement in which the 
Greek Cypriots seek a fuller implementation of the EU acquis, resisting 
temporary or permanent derogations from it. This situation highlights the 
counterproductive effects of Greek Cypriot fears and conservatism when it 
comes to any proposal that would integrate the Turkish Cypriot 
community more closely into the EU.  
Second, Cypriots are not fundamentally hostile towards each other 
and both communities have reached a level of political maturity necessary 
to re-evaluate their conflict-ridden pasts. Both acknowledge the mistakes 
committed by their own community in the conflict (85% GC and 50% TC), 
both recognise that a solution needs to be based on mutually acceptable 
compromises (81% GC and 69% TC) and both are absolutely opposed to the 
idea of ‘solving’ the conflict through armed struggle (89% GC and 92% TC) 
(see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4a. Greek Cypriot underlying attitudes regarding the Cyprus problem CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 11 
 
 
Figure 4b. Turkish Cypriot underlying attitudes regarding the Cyprus problem 
Third and alongside this, neither community is satisfied with the 
status quo, which also points to an underlying desire to move the peace 
process forward. This is especially evident for the Turkish Cypriots who, 
disillusioned with the Greek Cypriots and the international community for 
having rejected the Annan Plan and for not having found a way to lift their 
state of international isolation, declare themselves fundamentally 
dissatisfied with the status quo (46%) or as having mixed feelings towards 
it (38%). Yet also for the Greek Cypriots, only a minority declares itself 
satisfied with the status quo (15%), while the rest, not least in view of the 
inherent sense of insecurity vis-à-vis Turkey, are either fundamentally 
dissatisfied with the status quo (30%) or have mixed feelings about it (45%) 
(see Figure 5). A possible explanation of these differences may be that 
whereas Greek Cypriots are on the whole satisfied with their personal lives 
(51%), only 29% of the Turkish Cypriots are, not least because they are 
more directly affected by the consequences of the conflict (see Figure 6). It 
should be noted that the higher level of personal dissatisfaction among 
Turkish Cypriots is linked, as we shall see in a moment, with an equally 
strong sentiment that the Greek Cypriots, the European Union and the 
international community at large share part of the blame for their current 12 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
situation. Hence, the pressing need to improve the living conditions of the 
Turkish Cypriots, not just on humanitarian grounds but also to increase the 
level of trust of Turkish Cypriots towards the aforementioned actors. Such 
efforts will be most effective, and most supportive of efforts to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement, if the Greek Cypriots wholeheartedly 
participate in the endeavour in whichever way is appropriate. This would 
help to dilute current narratives within the Turkish Cypriot community 
that Greek Cypriots “are taking pleasure in the isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots”, or even that “they wish to maintain the Turkish Cypriots in an 
inferior social and economic level so that they remain the undisputed 
masters of the island”. At the same time, the fact that sizeable minorities in 
each community are satisfied with the status quo or have mixed feelings 
about it should serve as a warning sign to those charged with negotiating 
and then drafting a comprehensive settlement plan. Only if the end product 
of their deliberations is perceived, in both communities, as being 
significantly better than the status quo, can it be guaranteed that the large 
majority of the public will fall behind its leaders in support of a new 
settlement plan.   
 
Figure 5. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot levels of satisfaction regarding the 
current political situation CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 13 
 
 
Figure 6. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot levels of satisfaction regarding their 
personal lives 
Fourth, the two communities share important similarities in terms of 
their personal values. Both value independence highly (40% GC and 53% 
TC) and a feeling of responsibility (63% GC and 59% TC), while attributing 
less importance to imagination and creativity (21% GC and 21 % TC), and 
altruism (23% GC and 24% TC) (see Figure 7). Both appear to be religious, 
with 94% of Greek Cypriots and 88% of Turkish Cypriots viewing 
themselves as either practising or non-practising Orthodox 
Christians/Muslims respectively (see Figure 8).15 Both communities attach 
prime importance to their sense of security (86% GC and 85% TC), to 
kindness towards the other (85% GC and 90% TC) and to tradition (76% GC 
and 71% TC), while attributing less importance to wealth (17% GC and 28% 
TC), to spoiling oneself (28% GC and 52% TC) and to adventure (39% GC 
and 34% TC) (see Figure 9). The shared reluctance to embrace adventure 
may also indicate an underlying tendency in both communities towards 
risk aversion, creating a potential impediment to reaching a solution, which 
inevitably calls for a considerable leap of faith. In addition, the 
                                                      
15 Particularly as far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, this finding is 
particularly interesting in view of the widespread view that Turkish Cypriots are 
generally quite agnostic. 14 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
comparatively low importance that both communities ascribe to 
imagination and creativity may act as a further impediment, insofar as 
achieving mutually acceptable solutions to complex problems normally 
requires a healthy dose of creativity.  
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Figure 7. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot responses to the question: “Which 
values would you encourage your children to learn?” Respondents choose 
up to five options 
 
Figure 8a. Greek Cypriots and religious beliefs CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 15 
 
 
Figure 8b. Turkish Cypriots and religious beliefs 
 
 
Figure 9a. Greek Cypriot self-identification with alternative personal value sets 
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Figure 9b. Turkish Cypriot self-identification with alternative personal value sets 
Impressively, both communities mirror each other in terms of value 
preferences regarding conditions in society and public policy priorities. 
Both value economic growth highly (75% GC and 70% TC) and a stable 
economy (70% GC and 68% TC), but less so strong defence forces (37% GC 
and 40% TC), empowerment (46% GC and 45% TC) and the environment 
(38% GC and 42% TC) (see Figure 10). The two communities also mirror 
each other in terms of their ideological preferences, with the distribution of 
political preferences across the far left-far right spectrum following a 
similar curve (see Figure 11), whereby both communities are relatively 
centrist and non-polarised politically. This finding bodes well for the future 
of a sister political party or common political parties within a reunified 
island.   CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 17 
 
 
Figure 10. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot preferences regarding public policy 
priorities (primary option set). Respondents choose up to two options 
 
Figure 11. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot self-identification along the political 
spectrum 18 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
2.2  Differences, mistrust and lack of confidence 
In other aspects instead, the two communities differ in terms of personal 
values and values attributed to conditions in society. When asked to rank 
different values, Greek Cypriots prioritise tolerance and religious faith 
(58% and 44% respectively), while Turkish Cypriots put a premium on 
determination and obedience (41% and 33% respectively) (see Figure 7). 
The value attributed to obedience might also be related to the more 
ambivalent attitude that Turkish Cypriots have towards non-democratic 
forms of governance, whereby 68% would approve of a technocratic 
government and 51% are open to forms of authoritarian rule (see Figure 
12). As a visible effect of different contextual circumstances, Turkish 
Cypriots appear to be more transformationist, i.e. willing to change a 
diverse set of features within their society, valuing almost equally order 
(59%), democracy (51%), fighting inflation (41%) and freedom of speech 
(45%).  
 
Figure 12a. Greek Cypriot evaluation of alternative political systems 
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Figure 12b. Turkish Cypriot evaluation of alternative political systems 
By contrast, Greek Cypriots appear to care more for current problem areas 
within their society such as maintaining order (71%), fighting crime (62%) 
and fighting inflation (59%), as opposed to areas they feel relatively content 
with (e.g. democracy 33% and freedom of speech 34%) (see Figures 13 & 
14). This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that both communities 
consider democracy as the most desirable political system (97% GC and 
96% TC) (see Figure 12), the difference thus seeming to be that Greek 
Cypriots believe they live in an acceptable democracy and therefore see less 
need for action in this area. The Turkish Cypriots, while wanting more 
democracy, seem to be also open to forms of non-democratic yet effective 
and efficient government in so far as they may feel that they lack a fully 
democratic, effective and efficient government, so are therefore open to all 
experimentations of alternative forms of governance.  
 20 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
Figure 13. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot preferences regarding public policy 
priorities (1st complementary option set). Respondents choose up to two 
options 
 
Figure 14. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot preferences regarding public policy 
priorities (2nd complementary option set). Respondents choose up to two 
options CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 21 
 
Moreover, important elements of mistrust and scepticism persist. 
Both communities tend to be generally mistrustful of others, with only 5% 
of Greek Cypriots and 11% of Turkish Cypriots agreeing that “others 
generally try to be fair” (see Figure 15). Both communities tend to trust only 
their immediate surroundings including the family (98% GC and 96% TC), 
people they know personally (85% GC and 76% TC) and their 
neighbourhood (67% GC and 68% TC), while both are distrustful of 
strangers and people of other nationalities and faiths (see Figure 16). Greek 
Cypriots in particular also appear to be fomenting the potential for ethnic 
intolerance and xenophobia (probably not only towards Turkish Cypriots 
but also towards immigrants of other European countries), with only 8% of 
Greek Cypriots (as opposed to 37% TC) believing that ethnic diversity 
enriches life (see Figure 17). 
It is interesting to note that Greek Cypriots live in a comparatively 
multi-ethnic society whereas Turkish Cypriots live in a comparatively 
mono-ethnic society; at the same time, it is Turkish Cypriots who tend to 
espouse ethnic diversity and not the Greek Cypriots. Perhaps the responses 
of each community represent a form of over-compensation for their actual 
life experiences: the Greek Cypriots are becoming worried about the social 
consequences of an increasing influx of immigrants, while the Turkish 
Cypriots are becoming worried about their isolation from the other nations 
and nationalities of the world and acknowledge the need to achieve greater 
openness in society.  
Whatever the explanation for this phenomenon, some conclusions are 
obvious. On the one hand, policy-makers need to place an increased 
emphasis on multi-cultural education, both now and in the context of a re-
unified Cyprus; on the other hand, the increased levels of inter-ethnic 
openness that are now evidenced among Turkish Cypriots should be taken 
note of by those Greek Cypriots who currently worry that “in the context of 
a federal settlement conditions of ‘ethnic purity’ will prevail in the Turkish 
Cypriot Constituent State because this is what the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities will be working towards”. Clearly, the current findings 
constitute grounds for re-considering this position. 22 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
Figure 15. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot responses to the question: “Do you 
think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try to be fair?” 
 
 
Figure 16a. Greek Cypriot level of trust towards different social groups CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 23 
 
 
Figure 16b. Turkish Cypriot level of trust towards different social groups 
 
 
Figure 17. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot attitudes regarding ethnic diversity 
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Regarding levels of trust between the parties to the conflict, Greek 
Cypriots, possibly influenced by their long-standing political narrative that 
“our problem is not with the Turkish Cypriots but with Turkey”, say they 
trust Turkish Cypriots (61%); while Turkish Cypriots say that they mistrust 
Greek Cypriots (72%), their leader Christofias (74%) as well as Greek 
Cypriot parties and institutions (see Figure 18).16 By contrast and as a 
reflection of the ‘double minority’ problem characterising the conflict, 
Greek Cypriots, while trusting their own institutions (RoC courts and army 
76%, RoC government 75%) (see Figure 19) manifest outright mistrust for 
Turkey – its army (99%) and government (97%) – as well as those Turkish 
Cypriot actors, including political parties and the president, which are 
viewed as either weak or puppets in the hands of Ankara (see Figure 18). 
Yet the Turkish Cypriots, whose only protector is Ankara because of their 
persistent isolation, continue to place most trust in the army (93%), creating 
a significant context-driven divide with their Greek Cypriot counterparts 
(see Figure 19). This result also relates to and reflects back on the relative 
Turkish Cypriot openness towards the forms of non-democratic rule 
discussed above (see Figure 12). In addition, whereas Turkish Cypriots 
consider Greek Cypriots as being essentially in charge of their own affairs, 
Greek Cypriots perceive Turkey as being the unquestioned master of the 
beleaguered Turkish Cypriots (see Figure 20).  
 
Figure 18a. Greek Cypriot level of trust towards different groups and power 
centres related with the Turkish Cypriot community 
                                                      
16 Turkish Cypriot attitudes are probably conditioned by the Greek Cypriots’ 
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Figure 18b. Turkish Cypriot level of trust towards different groups and power 
centres related with the Greek Cypriot community 
 
Figure 19a. Greek Cypriot level of trust towards international organisations and 
institutions in their own community 26 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
Figure 19b. Turkish Cypriot level of trust towards international organisations and 
institutions in their own community 
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Figure 20a. Greek Cypriot perceptions regarding the locus of political authority in 
the Turkish Cypriot Community. Respondents choose up to two 
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Figure 20b. Turkish Cypriot perceptions regarding the locus of political authority 
in the Greek Cypriot Community. Respondents choose up to two 
options 
These perceptions regarding the locus of political control within the 
other community drive a further wedge of grievance and mistrust between 
them; the Greek Cypriot notion that the Turkish Cypriots are mere puppets 
in the hands of Ankara is received by the Turkish Cypriots as hurtful and 
insulting, despite – or even because of – Greek Cypriot assurances that “our 
problem is not with you but with Ankara”. At the same time, the 
perception among Turkish Cypriots that the Orthodox Church in the Greek 
Cypriot Community is somehow an equal partner of the president and the 
National Council in the formulation of Cyprus problem policy betrays a 
narrative that has been frozen in time since the early days of the conflict.  
Beyond their perceptions and (mis)trust of each other, both 
communities are also pessimistic regarding the peace process, with only 
18% of Greek Cypriots and 13% of Turkish Cypriots expressing 
unambiguous hope about a positive outcome (see Figure 21). This 
pessimism is particularly acute amongst Turkish Cypriots, who following 
the Annan Plan precedent have little faith in the peace process and Greek 
Cypriot willingness to deliver a compromise solution, as opposed to Greek 
Cypriots, who, emboldened by their new president, appear somewhat 28 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
more hopeful of the ongoing negotiations. Finally, both communities seem 
to be experiencing a crisis of confidence in the United Nations and its 
mediation efforts; only 44% of Greek Cypriots and 39% of Turkish Cypriots 
declare that they have confidence in the UN, percentages that are only 
paralleled by those for the political parties, which also suffer low levels of 
confidence among the public in both communities (46% GC and 27% TC) 
(see Figure 19). Regarding the UN in particular, the UNFICYP survey of 
200717 also identified this crisis of confidence; according to follow up 
questions within that survey, one major factor that contributed to the UN’s 
comparatively poor image among the Cypriots is the widespread sense that 
“little effort is being made to understand – and include in the peace process 
– the concerns and priorities of ordinary Cypriots”. Within that poll, 
several ways and means by which the UN could approach the public in 
both communities were tested, and all were found to be extremely popular. 
 
Figure 21. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot level of hope regarding the new 
process that began with the March 21st meeting between the two leaders 
                                                      
17 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFCYP) (2007), “The UN in Cyprus: An 
Inter-communal Survey of Public Opinion by UNIFCYP”, February-June 
(http://www.unficyp.org/media/Survey_24_04_2007_ENG.pdf). CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 29 
 
3.  Prospects for a Comprehensive Settlement 
The meeting on 21 March 2008 between the two Cypriot leaders led to a 
resumption of the peace process. This Cypriot-led process initially saw the 
establishment of six inter-communal working groups in April 2008 meeting 
twice a week and covering the principal items on the conflict settlement 
agenda: governance and power-sharing, EU matters, property, security and 
guarantees, economy, and territory. Seven technical committees were also 
set up to discuss crime, commerce, cultural heritage, crisis management, 
humanitarian issues, health and the environment. Moreover on 23 May 
2008, Christofias and Talat declared that a solution would entail a bi-zonal 
and bi-communal federation, with a single international personality and 
with a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot constituent state enjoying 
equal status. This was followed by the July 1st statement where the leaders 
agreed in principle that a solution would entail a single sovereignty and 
citizenship on the island. On July 25th a final review of the work of the 
working groups and technical committees was completed leading to 
agreement to commence fully-fledged negotiations as of 3 September 2008. 
Within this context, what do Cypriots think of the peace process, how 
should it be conducted and what kind of solution should it lead to?  
3.1  Convergence on process and principle 
Here as well, encouraging aspects of convergence come to the fore. Both 
communities believe the process should be Cypriot-owned, with Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot experts working together on the various items 
of the conflict settlement agenda, as opposed to third-party nationals being 
given this responsibility (GC 80% and TC 70%) (see Figure 22). Probably for 
very different reasons, either one or both communities are sceptical of 
previous initiatives or proposals as a basis of future talks, including the 
Annan Plan (60% GC and 43% TC against), the 1960 constitution (46% TC 
against) or a prior recognition of two states (64% GC against). Related to 
this, Greek Cypriots reject a confederation as the basis for a solution (50% 
against), both reject a land-for-recognition package (69% GCs and 53% TCs 
against) and Turkish Cypriots are sceptical of an evolutionary integration 
into a unified state (33% against) (see Figure 23). It is likely that both 
communities would accept a consensual evolutionary federation (e.g. 
through a Constitutional Convention), but an a priori specification that such 
an evolution would lead to a unified and centralised state is unsurprisingly 
resisted by the Turkish Cypriots.  30 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
Figure 22. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot responses to the question: “Who do 
you think should be primarily involved in the negotiations, on an expert 
level?” 
 
Figure 23a. Greek Cypriot preferences for the constitutional framework of a 
comprehensive settlement CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 31 
 
 
Figure 23b. Turkish Cypriot preferences for the constitutional framework of a 
comprehensive settlement  
By contrast, both communities converge on the idea that the basis for 
negotiations should be the 1977-79 High Level Agreements, with 63% of 
Greek Cypriots and 77% of Turkish Cypriots viewing this basis as either 
tolerable, satisfactory or desirable, leading to a ‘Bi-zonal Bi-communal 
Federation with Political Equality’, with 75% of Greek Cypriots and 90% of 
Turkish Cypriots viewing this final outcome as either tolerable, satisfactory 
or desirable (see Figure 23). It is interesting to note the small divergence in 
levels of support for the 1977-79 High Level Agreements (slightly lower in 
both communities) compared to levels of support for a ‘Bi-zonal Bi-
communal Federation with Political Equality’ or a ‘BBF’ (slightly higher in 
both communities). In the case of a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, it 
would seem that the rule applies whereby the less you specify in detail 
what lies behind a label the greater support you gather for the proposed 
solution in question. In the case of the High Level Agreements, while those 
texts specifically state that the solution will be federal, bi-zonal and bi-
communal, they also make some additional statements of principle to 
clarify what that federal solution would imply (e.g. the 1977 agreement, 
states that account will be taken of the special needs of the Turkish Cypriot 
community when resolving the property issue, or in the 1979 agreement, 32 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
that human rights and basic freedoms will apply). The more such 
clarifications are made, the greater the potential for supporters of a federal 
settlement, in either community, to fall away and join the sceptic camp.  
The Annan Plan is another very interesting example, which while 
representing one possible specification of a BBF, exhibits dramatic 
differences in the levels of support for a generic BBF and for the specific 
plan. There may be several explanations for this divergence. One 
explanation often heard in the south is that the ‘devil is in the detail’ and 
that while a BBF is intrinsically acceptable, the Annan Plan’s specific 
interpretation of it was not. An alternative reading, which enjoys more 
resonance in the north and in Turkey, is that the Greek Cypriot rejection of 
the Annan Plan was a litmus test of a broader rejection of a BBF, which can 
be easily concealed when only the general and unspecified proposition of a 
BBF is on the table. Another explanation may be that the label more than 
the substance of the Plan has been tarnished in the south.  
All these readings may hold some truth. The discrepancy in the 
figures also suggests that while prospects for an agreement on the basis of a 
BBF appear promising, the room for different interpretations of what this 
would entail necessitates further in-depth research that goes beyond the 
labels and into the specifics of what a settlement model would look like in 
practice. This should take place before final conclusions regarding the level 
of convergence of the two communities can be reached. We begin to do this 
in the pages that follow, but a more in-depth analysis of the various options 
– which the two communities may choose from in drafting a 
comprehensive settlement plan – will be conducted in the next poll planned 
within this project.  
Linked to this discussion, other polls conducted in 2008 among 
Turkish Cypriots suggest that support for federalism is waning in northern 
Cyprus as well. In fact, support for an ‘ideal’ two-state solution has 
increased since the failed referendum of 2004. Polls conducted in 2007 
demonstrate that the 2008 results are not unique.18 However, there is a limit 
to arguments surrounding the ‘ideal’ solution for both communities. It 
should also be appreciated that when polled in the context of the recent 
                                                      
18 The results of a KADEM poll released in January 2007 demonstrated that 65% of 
Turkish Cypriots favoured a two-state solution (http://acturca.wordpress.com/ 
2007/02/02/turkish-cypriots-in-favour-of-coexstence-of-two-separate-states-on-
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stalemate, respondents of both communities were likely to hold an 
underlying belief that a comprehensive and negotiated settlement is not in 
the offing – a perception that tended to influence poll responses, especially 
when solution types are directly compared, such as in a question of the 
type: “What do you prefer, a two-state solution or a federation? (Choose 
one)”. According to a UN poll conducted in 2007, overwhelming majorities 
of respondents from both communities considered that the Cyprus 
problem “will not be solved in the foreseeable future”.19 The same poll 
demonstrated that 59% of Turkish Cypriots considered a two-state solution 
satisfactory, with an additional 21% considering it tolerable. On the other 
s i d e ,  a  f u l l  7 1 %  o f  G r e e k  C y p r i o t s  considered a unitary state solution 
satisfactory. This notwithstanding, that poll, as well as the current one, 
treats each alternative separately, and does not force a comparison of ‘ideal’ 
types. Thus, when asked whether they would countenance federalism, 
majorities in both communities remain open to this alternative.  
Indeed in our poll, we find that over 75% of Turkish Cypriots polled 
consider mutual recognition of two states as a preferable precondition to 
negotiations. However, when asked whether the solution should be based 
on the principles of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with political 
equality, we see that less than 20% of Turkish Cypriots oppose this. In other 
words, the ideal option of two-states would not appear to be mutually 
exclusive with the alternative of a BBF, the former being an ideal first best 
and the latter an achievable second best. Likewise, Greek Cypriots would 
also prefer a gradual full integration into a unitary state, but are open to a 
second best federal settlement. In fact, the percentage of those absolutely 
hostile to a federal settlement is similar in both communities, hovering 
between 10% and 20%. This implies that whereas a federal settlement is a 
compromise for both it would rally majority acceptance on both sides of the 
island. Whereas the two communities have polarised views on ‘ideal’ 
solutions, they share an identifiable area of second-best overlap (see Figure 
23).   
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3.2  Areas of convergence and divergence on settlement details  
Moving into the detail of a comprehensive agreement, there is some scope 
for optimism and convergence, particularly on issues such as the economy 
and Cyprus’ international perspectives. On Cyprus’ future economic 
outlook, both agree on the principle that all efforts should be made to 
equalise the two communities’ living standards, preferably with a 
significant input by the international community and the EU (79% GC and 
62% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, desirable or essential). Both 
agree that achieving this goal – and, beyond it, ensuring long term 
economic growth for the benefit of all Cypriots – would require a carefully 
planned economic development strategy (82% GC and 83% TC), with the 
financial and economic ramifications of a settlement being evaluated 
carefully prior to an agreement (75% GC and 85% TC), and that economic 
integration ought to be carried out gradually, with temporary restrictions 
to protect vulnerable groups (79% GC and 79% TC) and by encouraging 
joint business ventures between the two communities (77% GC and 65% 
TC) (see Table 1). The question of inserting temporary restrictions to the 
economic reunification of the island links to the critical policy question 
facing the leaderships in Cyprus and the EU: whether and how to include 
temporary restrictions on the implementation of the EU acquis following 
the reunification of the island. 
Likewise, both communities share similar aspirations regarding 
Cyprus’ future international outlook, which would see Cyprus within the 
eastern Mediterranean and the EU, projecting peace, stability and 
prosperity to its wider neighbourhood. Both agree that Cyprus should 
enjoy sovereign equality in its international relations with Greece and 
Turkey (87% GC and 69% TC). Both agree that post-settlement Cyprus 
should support Turkey’s EU membership bid (53% GC and 80% TC), and 
that Cyprus should participate fully in EU foreign policy (79% GC and 56% 
TC). Both concur that Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, as strategic partners, 
should promote stability and development in the wider eastern 
Mediterranean region including the Balkans and the Middle East (62% GC 
and 68% TC) (see Table 2).    
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GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent
-Unsure 
Satisfactory - 
Essential 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent
-Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
DOSSIER 
The financial and economic ramifications of the 
settlement must be carefully evaluated by experts in 
advance of the agreement, to ensure that there will not 
be any unexpected negative consequences. 
7%  18%  75%  10%  5%  85%  Economics 
The settlement should include a complete economic 
development plan, to outline the strategy for 
economic progress and growth in the first few years 
after a settlement for the benefit of all economic 
groups in society. 
9%  9%  82%  12%  5%  83%  Economics 
Economic integration needs to take place at a 
moderate pace, with some temporary restrictions, in 
order to protect potentially vulnerable economic 
groups (low skilled workers, small businesses etc.) 
from competition they are not ready to face. 
11%  9%  79%  15%  7%  79%  Economics 
In the settlement, joint business ventures between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be encouraged 
through appropriate incentive schemes as a way to 
improve the relations between the two communities 
and encourage economic growth. 
14%  9%  77%  29%  7%  65%  Economics 
Immediately after the settlement, every effort must be 
made to bring the standard of living of the Turkish 
Cypriots on a par with the standard of living of Greek 
Cypriots, but financed in such a way as not to burden 
the Greek Cypriots. 
14%  7%  79%  31%  7%  62%  Economics 
Table 1. Areas of convergence in the economics dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda  
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GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL 
Unacceptable 
– Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
DOSSIER 
Greece, Turkey and unified Cyprus 
should become strategic partners 
after a settlement, working together 
to promote the stability and 
development of other countries in 
the Balkans and the Middle East. 
20%  18%  62%  25%  8%  68% 
International 
Outlook 
After a settlement, unified Cyprus 
must enjoy relations of sovereign 
equality with Greece and Turkey, 
and not be seen in any way as 
inferior or subordinate to them. 
7%  6%  87%  22%  9%  69% 
International 
Outlook 
After a settlement, unified Cyprus 
should participate fully in the 
development and execution of the 
EU’s common foreign policy. 
10%  11%  79%  34%  10%  56% 
International 
Outlook 
Once a settlement is reached, and 
given that all parties – Greek 
Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey 
and Greece – honour their part of 
the agreement, unified Cyprus 
should support Turkey’s bid for EU 
membership. 
34%  13%  53%  13%  7%  80% 
International 
Outlook 
Table 2. Areas of convergence in the international outlook dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda 
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As for other dossiers on the conflict settlement agenda, there is 
significant distance and polarisation between the two communities. This 
especially concerns questions of governance, property, residence, ‘settlers’ 
and security. On governance, there is divergence on issues related to veto 
rights in the decision-making process. On property, there is divergence 
regarding whether a solution should primarily take the form of restitution 
or compensation. Regarding ‘settlers’, Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots have contrasting views on the repatriation of Turkish immigrants. 
On security, we found some polarisation, especially in matters related to 
the prospect of demilitarisation. On residence rights, there are clear 
differences in the interpretation of b i - z o n a l i t y ,  w i t h  G r e e k  C y p r i o t s  
strongly opposing and Turkish Cypriots preferring that members of each 
community should live primarily within the boundaries of their own 
constituent state (see Table 3).   
Despite divergences, there is scope to move these dossiers forward, 
both through the convergence of views regarding principle and procedure. 
Across all dossiers, generally we found relatively high levels of support for 
measures that would help provide more accurate information about daily 
reality, which is necessary to elaborate more realistic and appealing 
proposals. As we shall consider below, these fact-finding exercises, be they 
a census on population, on property or on security threat perceptions, 
could also represent important confidence-building steps between the 
communities, possibly contributing to a process of depolarisation on more 
detailed substantive matters.   
On governance and power sharing issues, both communities agree on 
the principle that a future bi-communal government should be functional 
(84% GC and 77% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, desirable or 
essential) and ensure effective participation of both communities in 
decision-making (76% GC and 74% TC) (see Table 4). 
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GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent
-Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
Unacceptable - 
Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
DOSSIER 
Each community should have the right to unilaterally 
block any decision or legislation of the federal 
government that it considers to be incompatible with 
its own communal interests.  
38%  21%  41%  21%  7%  72% 
Governance 
& power-
sharing 
The property issue should be solved primarily 
through restitution, so that affected individuals will 
regain control of their properties as they had them 
before the events of the Cyprus problem. 
6%  3%  91%  52%  6%  42%  Property 
All people who came from Turkey after 1974, 
including their descendents, should return to Turkey 
after a settlement. The only possible exception is the 
case of those who have married Turkish Cypriots and 
the children of such mixed marriages. 
29%  6%  65%  72%  5%  23%  Citizenship 
After the settlement, Cyprus should be fully 
demilitarised. All foreign troops should withdraw 
and all Cypriot armies should be disbanded. 
23%  11%  66%  75%  8%  17% 
Security & 
guarantees 
In the context of a settlement, all, or almost all of the 
Greek Cypriots should live in the Greek Cypriot 
state, while all, or almost all of the Turkish Cypriots 
should live in the Turkish Cypriot state. 
63%  10%  27%  29%  5%  66% 
Residence 
rights 
Table 3. Areas of divergence and intensely contested issues in the various dossiers of the comprehensive settlement agenda  
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GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory - 
Essential 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory - 
Essential 
ASPECT 
Effective participation both of Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the 
decision-making process should be 
included in the administrative 
provisions of the settlement.  
14%  10%  76%  18%  8%  74% 
Governance & 
power-sharing 
The administrative provisions of the 
settlement must be such as to ensure 
the functionality of government, and 
specifically to ensure that the 
government will be able to make swift 
and correct decisions.  
7%  9%  84%  13%  10%  77% 
Governance & 
power-sharing 
Table 4. Areas of convergence in the governance and power-sharing dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda 
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Both communities converge on the idea that prior to an agreement on 
property and precisely in order to ensure that such a deal is satisfactory, 
there should be a process of consultation with all affected persons, with 
86% Greek Cypriots and 77% Turkish Cypriots believing this to be 
satisfactory, desirable or essential. Both communities also accept the idea 
that the international community, including Greece and Turkey, should 
contribute financially to the settlement of the property issue (80% GC and 
76% TC). There is also agreement on the idea that prior to an agreement on 
property, there ought to be a full census of all affected properties 
examining their current use and conditions (78% GC and 62% TC) (see 
Table 5). It is worth noting that most of these points of convergence on the 
property dossier are related, as we have mentioned above, to fact-finding 
activities. On the one hand through consultations with affected individuals, 
and on the other hand by conducting a census of properties.  
While such proposals make sense on an intuitive level – insofar as it 
appears paradoxical for leaders to be representing individuals regarding 
their property rights without consulting them, or for detailed negotiations 
to be taking place without having a clear picture of the financial costs and 
other parameters of the property issue – they have nonetheless not been a 
component of the negotiation process so far. By discussing the property 
issue on an abstract level, however, it becomes extremely difficult to reach 
a compromise between the competing principles of the two sides 
(restitution vs. compensation) and even when a compromise is reached it 
becomes very difficult to legitimise it to the wider public and to the affected 
individuals in particular.  
Turning to residence, despite divergence on detail, both communities 
accept the principle that a balanced compromise is needed between the 
Greek Cypriot desire for freedom of settlement and Turkish Cypriot 
concerns for bi-zonality (52% GC and 57% TC viewing this as either 
satisfactory, desirable or essential) (see Table 6).  
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GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory -
Essential 
DOSSIER 
The international community – including 
Turkey and Greece – should contribute 
generously to the financial cost involved 
in the resolution of the property issue. 
8%  12%  80%  18%  6%  76%  Property 
In order to reach a satisfactory solution to 
the property issue, the affected individuals 
themselves – the ordinary Greek Cypriot 
and Turkish Cypriot refugees – need to be 
consulted so that the solution will be 
tailor-made to their real requirements. 
10%  5%  86%  19%  4%  77%  Property 
Before the property issue can be resolved, 
a full census of all affected properties 
should take place, in both communities, 
examining their current use and condition. 
This property census would then be used 
by the negotiators of the two communities 
in their deliberations. 
15%  7%  78%  30%  8%  62%  Property 
Table 5. Areas of convergence in the property dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda  
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GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL  Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent
-Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
DOSSIER 
A balanced compromise will need to be 
struck between the desire of Greek 
Cypriots to be able to live freely anywhere 
in post-settlement Cyprus, and the desire 
of Turkish Cypriots to ensure that they 
will remain the effective majority in the 
region that they will control. 
35%  13%  52%  33%  10%  57% 
Residence 
rights 
Table 6. Areas of convergence in the residence rights dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda 
GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL  Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
Unacceptable 
– Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory - 
Essential 
DOSSIER 
In order to properly resolve the issue of 
the people from Turkey, a complete and 
internationally monitored population 
census must first take place, in both 
communities, so that the negotiators have 
a clear picture of the extent and 
parameters of the problem which they are 
trying to solve. 
12%  7%  81%  29%  8%  63%  Citizenship 
Table 7. Areas of convergence in the citizenship dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda  
 
C
Y
P
R
U
S
:
 
B
U
I
L
D
I
N
G
 
C
O
N
F
I
D
E
N
C
E
 
I
N
 
P
E
A
C
E
 
|
 
4
3
 
 
GREEK CYPRIOTS  TURKISH CYPRIOTS 
PROPOSAL 
Unacceptable 
- Tolerable 
Ambivalent
-Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
Unacceptable 
– Tolerable 
Ambivalent-
Unsure 
Satisfactory 
- Essential 
DOSSIER 
In order to reach a satisfactory solution to 
the security aspect, the security concerns 
and fears of both communities need to be 
taken into account as well as the objective 
threats that Cyprus might face in the 
future. 
6%  5%  89%  14%  7%  79% 
Security & 
guarantees 
Post-settlement Cyprus will need to 
maintain a moderately-sized professional 
security force, bi-communal in 
composition, which would be responsible 
to defend the island from any internal 
and external threats. 
17%  11%  72%  27%  6%  67% 
Security & 
guarantees 
Table 8. Areas of convergence in the security and guarantees dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda 
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Regarding ‘settlers’, both communities agree that an adequate 
solution would necessitate a complete and internationally-monitored 
population census (81% GC and 63% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, 
desirable or essential) (see Table 7). In 2006 the Turkish Cypriot authorities 
conducted a census in northern Cyprus that revealed there was a total of 
256,644 permanent residents at the time of the census.20 Of these 178,031 
held TRNC citizenship. The remaining 78,613 were of foreign origin with 
work or residency permits – the vast majority (70,525) hailing from Turkey. 
However, the statistics are complicated by the fact that many ‘settlers’ now 
hold TRNC citizenship. Indeed, nearly 43,000 (or approximately 25%) 
TRNC citizens are dual nationals. It was reported, for instance, that among 
TRNC citizens, nearly 45,000 indicated that their parents were born in 
Turkey. We find no reason to dispute the methodology and results of this 
census; however, conducting a new internationally-monitored population 
census on both sides of the island would seem appropriate and would 
certainly increase the confidence of both parties in each other and in its 
results. Only in this way might it be possible to put a halt to the war of 
words, distortions and manipulations that have long surrounded the 
‘settlers’ issue in Cyprus.  
On security, we found wide consensus on the principle that the 
security needs of both communities ought to be satisfactorily met through a 
process in which the fears and concerns of each community will be 
carefully examined (89% GC and 79% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, 
desirable or essential) (see Table 8). It should be noted at this point that 
while discussions and negotiations on security have always been one of the 
most polarising issues of the Cyprus conflict, at no stage has there been a 
concerted effort between the various sides to agree in principle what the 
underlying security challenges – on which a security architecture should be 
built – actually are. Instead, negotiations are typically limited only to a 
discussion of security structures as such, for instance how many troops 
should remain, whether Greece and Turkey should or should not have 
intervention rights etc. Given that so far there has been no effort to 
commonly identify the underlying problem that such security structures are 
meant to solve, the ongoing deadlock in the security dossier does not come 
                                                      
20 The TRNC State Planning Organization provides statistics over the internet.  See 
http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Kesin-sonuc-index_en.html. CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 45 
 
as a surprise. An analysis of threats and threat perceptions would be more 
complete if it included the viewpoints of all sides of the conflict, including 
Greece and Turkey as well as the Cypriots, in the hope that such a dialogue 
will provide the basis for convergence between all actors, in the context of a 
security architecture that simultaneously responds to the concerns of 
everyone involved. 
Another element of convergence between the two communities as 
regarding the Security dossier is their agreement on the need for Cyprus to 
establish a professional bi-communal security force (72% GC and 67%) (see 
Table 8). This is a particularly interesting finding given that negotiations on 
the security architecture on the island have often been trapped between the 
Greek Cypriot insistence on demilitarisation and Turkish Cypriot insistence 
on Turkish troop presence. Adding a third option to this discussion may 
inject a new lease of life into the security negotiations. 
4.  Building Confidence in Each Other and in the Peace Process 
Throughout the decades of Cyprus’ partition, Cypriots and international 
mediators alike have discussed the relative virtues of confidence-building 
measures (CBMs) versus negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. In 
key instances such as 1992-93, following the failure of negotiations over the 
UN “Set of Ideas”, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali 
proposed to turn negotiation efforts to CBMs in view of the “deep crisis of 
confidence” between the parties.21 The proposed CBM package foresaw the 
Greek Cypriot resettlement in the ghost town of Varosha under a UN 
administration and the establishment of an inter-communal tax-free trade 
area there, together with the reopening of Nicosia international airport. 
Discussions over the package took place in May-June 1993. Negotiations 
ultimately failed, as they became entangled over details of principle and 
implementation. In other instances, it was either one or the other Cypriot 
leader who turned to CBMs. Yet the track record here too has been poor. 
Whenever the leaderships shifted their attention to CBMs, their principal 
objective and ensuing effect appeared to be that of distracting attention 
                                                      
21 S. Bölükbaşı (1995), Boutros-Ghali’s Cyprus Initiative in 1992: Why did it fail? 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 460-482. 46 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
from a comprehensive deal.22 In the recent past for example, the Greek 
Cypriot leadership pursued this route, proposing in 2006 that the Turkish 
Cypriots could return Varosha to Greek Cypriot rule and ‘gain’ the joint 
Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot management of Famagusta port so as to 
allow direct trade with the EU. Negotiations on this mini-package stalled 
with intransigent positions and mutual recriminations. By contrast, by far 
the most significant CBM has been the opening of the Green Line in April 
2003. This step was entirely unilateral, not the result of negotiation and 
agreement. 
This track record reveals several important lessons. Now, at a 
moment in which a peace process aimed at a comprehensive settlement has 
been re-launched and hopes are cautiously high on its prospects of 
delivery, it would be unwise to divert attention to talks over complex and 
negotiated CBM packages. In contrast, unilateral CBMs or non-
controversial CBMs oriented towards inter-societal reconciliation may have 
a very positive impact and may add momentum to the peace process 
within a strategic context of renewed negotiations. This is especially the 
case, as we have seen, in view of the significant lack of confidence that 
Cypriots have towards each other, and – particularly in the case of the 
Turkish Cypriots – towards the peace process, the EU and the international 
community.  
It is precisely in this spirit that we note the ongoing efforts to build 
confidence in parallel to negotiations. Most notable is the opening of the 
Ledra Street crossing in April 2008 and more crossings, specifically at 
Limnitis/Yeşilırmak are on the table. Moreover, on 25 July 2008 a number 
of CBMs were announced through the aforementioned Christofias-Talat 
joint statement. These steps notwithstanding, there remains a dire need to 
build confidence, trust and social capital within and between the 
communities as well as between Cypriots, Turkey, Greece and the EU, 
calling for CBMs between and by all actors. Several recent events of tit-for-
tat politics on the island further highlight the urgency of such measures.23  
                                                      
22 See also International Crisis Group (2008), Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet, 
Europe Report, No. 194, 23 June, p. 9. 
23 For example, although the opening of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing had been 
on the agenda of the leaders, the Turkish Cypriot side declined to permit the 
crossing of Greek Cypriot pilgrims to Morphou/Guzelyurt on 2 September 2008, 
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As such and precisely to act in support of the peace process, we now 
turn to a set of CBMs that could be pursued alongside negotiations over a 
comprehensive settlement. 
4.1  CBMs enjoying wide support by both communities 
We begin by discussing a set of CBMs that could arguably be agreed and 
implemented easily, in so far as they win the consent of significant 
majorities in both communities without strong opposition in either one. 
While seemingly representing minor steps within the overall context of the 
conflict, their implementation could boost the peace process by building 
confidence between Cypriots, of Cypriots vis-à-vis the negotiations, and of 
Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis the EU and the international community.  
To some extent this is already being done with Christofias and Talat 
having agreed on the opening of the Ledra Street crossing on 3 April 2008. 
Further progress has been made by the technical committees. In particular 
agreement has been reached on the crossing of ambulances across the 
Green Line, trilingual (Greek, Turkish and English) road signs across the 
island, cooperation on public health issues, and repair work on two 
churches in the north in June 2008.24 More has been promised through the 
25 July 2008 statement, although confidence can only be built once these 
measures are actually implemented.25 In the area of environmental 
                                                                                                                                       
citing “technical” reasons, despite the fact that a few weeks prior to this Turkish 
Cypriots had travelled to Kokkina/Erenkoy through the same crossing point to 
mark the anniversary of the 1964 inter-communal clashes. Upon being notified of 
the Turkish Cypriot decision not to permit the crossing of Greek Cypriots, Mr. 
Christofias’ representative and presidential commissioner, George Iacovou walked 
out of his scheduled meeting with his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Ozdil Nami. 
Another case in point is a recent event in the mixed village of Pyla/Pile where 
Turkish Cypriot-owned shop windows, a car, and an Ataturk bust were damaged. 
Although this was a relatively minor incident of vandalism and the respective 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot mukthars immediately produced a joint 
statement and press conference, opposition groups were quick to portray the 
events as symbolic of the fact that coexistence was problematic. 
24 See International Crisis Group (2008), op. cit., pp.  6-7. 
25 Despite agreement on road signs, for instance, there is no indication that changes 
are being made. Despite a wildfire on the Kyrenia mountain range in August 2008, 
there was no cooperative effort to put out the fire. 48 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
protection, both sides agreed to prevent illegal dumping sites in the buffer 
zone, to exchange information between environmental experts and to 
cooperate on the prevention of wildfires. Further measures included 
cooperation in waste management, raising awareness for water 
conservation, dealing with quarrying, biodiversity protection, marine 
management, and the management of chemical, asbestos, and historical 
pollution. With respect to cultural heritage a list of immovable cultural 
heritage is to be compiled and additional restoration projects to be 
determined. Guidelines are to be produced for the development of an 
interactive educational computer programme. In the area of crisis 
management, mechanisms for cooperation are envisaged.  Finally, 
cooperation in crime and criminal matters is to be enhanced through the 
exchange of information and intelligence.  
In the sections that follow, we turn to some of the specific measures 
mentioned above as they relate to the poll. These are relatively easy areas 
for collaboration, reflecting functional needs and interdependencies. 
Moreover, as the poll results below reveal, there is much more that could 
be done, which would garner the consent of both communities and could 
thus be easily agreed. 
4.1.1   Fighting organised crime 
First, joint steps could be taken to fight organised crime, operating across 
the buffer zone. This would entail a tripartite cooperation between Greek 
Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the UN. As listed above, the July 25th 
package included the goal of fostering cooperation in this area. 
Interestingly, as discussed above, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots place a high value on living in secure surroundings, the 
maintenance of order and – the Greek Cypriots in particular – strongly 
prioritise the need to fight crime. Unsurprisingly therefore, both 
communities agree on the benefits of finding joint responses to the fight 
against organised crime, with 90% Greek Cypriots and 72% Turkish 
Cypriots being moderately or strongly i n  f a v o u r  o f  s u c h  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h u s  
making this a prime candidate for a win-win and easily agreed inter-
communal CBM (see Figure 24). The need for such collaboration is self-
evident, with the crossings serving as a focal point for smugglers and 
organised crime. Moreover, criminal investigations are hampered when CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 49 
 
evidence is not shared by the respective authorities.26 Meanwhile, given the 
growing problem of human trafficking across the green line, the EU also 
has a stake in cooperation.   
 
Figure 24. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal that the two 
communities should find ways to jointly fight organised crime that 
operates across the buffer zone 
4.1.2  International sporting events 
A second critical CBM would be the joint participation of Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots in international sporting events, with 71% Greek 
Cypriots and 67% Turkish Cypriots being in favour (see Figure 25). 
Enacting such solutions would serve the double purpose of building 
confidence between the two communities as well as making the Turkish 
Cypriots feel part of the international community by lifting the 
international isolation on a critical aspect of social and cultural life. To date, 
attempts to include Turkish Cypriots in international sporting events have 
been built on existing Republic of Cyprus institutions and as such have 
                                                      
26 Prominently, following the murder of Elmas Guzelyurtlu – a Turkish Cypriot 
businessman living in the south – and his family in 2005, an investigation in 2005 
proved inconclusive when Turkish Cypriot authorities could not obtain DNA 
samples and other evidence from a crime scene in the southern part of the island. 
On this see S. Bahcheli (2006), “Haven for criminals”, Cyprus Mail, 24 September. 50 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
unsurprisingly met Turkish Cypriot resistance.27 Searching for new 
avenues would thus entail finding creative solutions to a whole set of 
questions regarding representation and recognition, including which flag 
Cyprus would use and how the two communities would be represented.  
 
Figure 25. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to find 
ways so that the two communities can jointly participate in international 
sporting events 
Various precedents offer interesting lessons. In the case of Korea, while 
participating in the Olympics with separate teams, athletes from the two 
Koreas have since the 2000 Olympics marched together in the same 
uniform under the same ‘unification flag’ singing the same song “Arirang” 
instead of their separate anthems.28 Another interesting case is that of 
Ireland, where despite being part of two separate states, the Ireland Rugby 
Union Team represents both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
                                                      
27 For instance, in the summer of 2008, the world football’s governing body FIFA 
and its European counterpart UEFA offered the Turkish Cypriot Football 
Association cooperation through the Cyprus Football Association. One upshot 
would be the ability to play international ‘friendlies’ at club level. However, unlike 
in the cases cited above, this would entail Turkish Cypriot recognition of the 
Republic of Cyprus association. As a result, at the time of writing, the Turkish 
Cypriot Football Association rejected this proposal, although it also wished to 
continue discussing the matter with FIFA officials. 
28 See http://www.theolympian.com/sports/story/494760.html. CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 51 
 
with a flag designed especially for this purpose.29 In the case of Cyprus, the 
UN has already hinted at the possibility of participating jointly in 
international sporting events under the UN flag. Alternatively, the first step 
of this CBM could be precisely that of organising a Cypriot flag 
competition. 
4.1.3  Protecting cultural heritage 
A third CBM that would meet the broad consensus of both communities 
(92% GC and 72% TC) would be that of finding joint ways to protect the 
cultural heritage of one community that is located within the territory 
under the control of the other (see Figure 26). Restoration projects are not 
new to Cyprus. A number have been sponsored through the UNDP. 
Crucially, what needs to be demonstrated here is the ability to cooperate 
bilaterally and instil a sense of mutual respect for each other’s culture, 
tradition and history – an essential step on the way towards a unified and 
multicultural federal Cyprus. 
 
Figure 26. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to examine 
ways so that each community can protect that part of its cultural 
heritage that happens to be under the control of the other community 
                                                      
29 For an image of the All Ireland Rugby Union Team see http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Image:Ireland_rugby.png. 52 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
4.1.4  Establishing a social reconciliation committee 
A fourth CBM would be that of establishing a social reconciliation 
committee (85% GC and 71% TC) (see Figure 27). The task of such a 
committee would not be to revisit historical narratives, facts and events, a 
far thornier issue to which we return below, but rather to focus on the 
current state, causes and symptoms of inter-communal suspicion and 
mistrust, and ways to overcome these. As discussed above, Cypriots 
appear to be generally mistrustful of anyone beyond their personal 
acquaintances, as well as being especially suspicious of each other and, 
particularly in the case of the Turkish Cypriots, of the international 
community and the EU. Hence the importance of understanding both the 
conflict and non-conflict related causes of such suspicion and mistrust, in 
order to identify possible solutions.  
 
Figure 27. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to form a 
Social Reconciliation Committee 
This CBM would build confidence in two ways. First, the very act of 
forming such a joint initiative would help build inter-communal social 
capital on the island, which, as the literature on civil society and conflict CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 53 
 
indicates, is critical to achieving reconciliation.30 Second, by focusing this 
enterprise on the discussion and identification of solutions to joint and 
reciprocal suspicions, this measure would help tackle and potentially 
reduce mistrust, which is clearly a major cause of the lack of confidence 
between the parties.  
  Some steps in this area are already being taken. The European Union 
intends to fund projects to this end and to facilitate reconciliation in the 
interim. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is working 
with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot human rights associations to help 
pave the way for revision of the divisive historical narratives of each side, 
as well as promoting a shared understanding of the past.31 Yet a far more 
generous and systematic effort in this direction would require a 
commitment to engage by the two leaders as well.  
4.1.5  Turkish Cypriot EU harmonisation 
A fifth CBM falling under this category would be that of cooperating 
together and with the EU to encourage Turkish Cypriot harmonisation 
with the acquis communautaire. Both communities (79% GC and 66% TC) in 
fact agree that measures should be sought to bring Turkish Cypriot society, 
institutions and norms closer to those of the EU, so as to allow Turkish 
Cypriots to become fully active participants in EU institutions and policies 
immediately, within the context of a comprehensive settlement (see Figure 
28). Translated into EU jargon this would entail measures to allow and 
expedite Turkish Cypriot harmonisation with the acquis, a process that is 
currently ongoing but which has faced difficulties stemming from Greek 
Cypriot resistance to the use made of EU funds and assistance to northern 
Cyprus. As in the case of joint participation in international sporting 
events, this CBM would serve the dual purpose of building confidence 
between Cypriots as well as establishing Turkish Cypriot trust in the 
international community and in the EU in particular.   
                                                      
30 A. Varshney (2001), “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society”, World Politics, Vol. 53, 
pp. 362-98. 
31 http://www.ictj.com 54 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
 
Figure 28. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to bring 
Turkish Cypriots closer to EU norms in view of a settlement 
4.1.6  Renovating and making joint use of buildings on Ledra Street 
As a first act of mutual trust, confidence and goodwill between the two 
Cypriot leaders, the Ledra Street crossing, an unnecessary bone of 
contention for a number of years, was reopened in April 2008. Yet the old 
buildings on this historic street crossing the Green Line, remain damaged 
and in dire need of renovation. Both communities broadly agree (88% GC 
and 65% TC) that these buildings on the buffer zone should be restored and 
used for joint activities (see Figure 29). These activities could include, for 
example, the social reconciliation committee, as well as more contentious 
civil society work such as the revisiting of historical narratives or joint 
discussions on the more challenging issues of the Cyprus conflict, 
alongside more ordinary day-to-day activities such as socialising or 
enjoying a meal together in a safe and neutral space.  
In fact as discussed above, both as far as personal and societal values are 
concerned, as well as views and positions on the conflict settlement agenda, 
there remain wide areas of divergence and mistrust. Focusing joint civil 
society activities on discussions regarding issues such as multiculturalism 
(where especially the Greek Cypriots manifest a worrying level of 
intolerance) or on the most polarising aspects of the conflict (e.g. bi-
zonality, property, demographics and settlers, as discussed above) could 
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renovated buildings on Ledra Street could host meetings between the two 
communities, as well as wider events at both official and civil society levels, 
including meetings between political parties, unions, professional 
associations, academics and NGOs, and with representatives from Greece 
and Turkey too. Carrying out these meetings, activities and discussions 
within physical spaces symbolising inter-communal reconciliation and 
compromise would in and of itself boost confidence and goodwill in 
pursuing further conflict transformation activities. Furthermore, creating a 
neutral space where members of each community can meet the other 
without crossing into an area that is ‘dominated by the other’, may reduce 
levels of apprehension and thus facilitate genuine contact between 
individuals and small groups of the two communities, especially among 
those who – for reasons of fear or due to personally held convictions – have 
so far declined to make use of the option to cross over into the area 
controlled by the other community. 
 
 
Figure 29. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to restore 
and make joint use of old buildings in the buffer zone near the Ledra 
Street crossing 
4.2  More challenging CBMs  
A second category of CBMs includes measures that enjoy narrow majority 
support in both communities, while also meeting resistance from sizeable 
minorities in either one or both, and which would thus require careful 
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first set of CBMs, these measures could be pursued alongside the peace 
process aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement, and would in fact 
serve to boost this process and ease agreement on several items on the 
conflict settlement agenda. Progress in negotiating such issues is likely to 
mirror the state of play in talks over a comprehensive settlement. In this 
respect, care should be taken to ensure that positive synergies are 
developed on both tracks of negotiations, as opposed to a scenario whereby 
obstacles in talks over more complex CBMs become a distraction that 
would contaminate negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. Before 
proceeding, and precisely on the question of packaging, one general 
observation is in order. In Cyprus, labels and packaging matter. Above we 
discussed how, whereas Greek Cypriots generally accept a BBF, they 
adamantly reject the Annan Plan, despite the latter being a detailed 
specification of what the former might look like. Also in the case of CBMs 
as we shall see below, whereas topics labelled “direct trade”, “direct 
flights” or the “return of Varosha” inspire instinctive negativity from one 
community or the other, Cypriots may not be against relabelled and 
conceptually reworked proposals on these very same issues.  
4.2.1  Including northern Cyprus in the EU customs union 
The question of direct trade, while continuing to require serious effort, 
pressure and creative proposals on the part of the EU in particular, has 
become highly polarised within Cyprus, being widely accepted by the 
Turkish Cypriots but strongly rejected by the Greek Cypriots (60% GC 
against, 85% TC in favour). Yet this does not imply that the two 
communities and the Greek Cypriots in particular oppose measures to 
encourage the economic development of the Turkish Cypriots. In fact both 
agree (58% GC and 67% TC) that economic ties between the two 
communities should be strengthened through trade and common 
enterprises (see Figure 30). This could include specific EU, Greek Cypriot 
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Figure 30. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to enhance 
the economic ties between the two communities through trade and 
common enterprises 
It could also entail a further modification of the EU Green Line 
regulation. Following the referenda and the ensuing entry of the divided 
Cyprus into the EU, a regulation was approved by the EU Council of 
Ministers on 28 April 2004, which was meant to ensure that the Green Line 
would not represent the EU’s external borders and would encourage 
reunification. First, the regulation sought to secure EU citizenship rights for 
individual Turkish Cypriots by allowing their free movement across the 
island. Second, the regulation sought to promote intra-island trade, 
allowing Turkish Cypriots to send their indigenous goods to the south, to 
be sold there or exported to other EU markets via southern Cypriot ports. 
But the regulation has failed to kick-start substantial cross-border trade. 
Hence, in June 2008 the Green Line regulation was modified to allow for 
trade in agricultural goods, increase the maximum value in the personal 
luggage of persons crossing the line and, most importantly, allow for the 
temporary import of tools from Turkey necessary to produce Turkish 
Cypriot goods destined for export.   
This last element in the deal, while seemingly marginal, could prove 
pivotal in ushering the way for a far more significant modification of the 
green line regulation. Such a modification would allow Turkish Cypriot-
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exported to the EU; this would significantly boost the Turkish Cypriot 
economy, as well as act as a critical CBM between the two communities, 
between Greek Cypriots and Turkey, and between the Turkish Cypriots 
and the EU. It would first require a Turkish Cypriot unilateral adoption of 
the EU’s common external tariff, removing financial tariff barriers between 
northern Cyprus and the EU. This would come within the wider effort 
being undertaken by the Turkish Cypriot community to harmonise with 
the acquis communautaire. Second it would call for Greek Cypriot consent to 
an EU amendment of the Green Line regulation to allow Turkish (and other 
EU) originating products to cross the line in both directions. Third it would 
require EU acceptance to jointly manage Famagusta port with Turkish 
Cypriot authorities. Alongside Turkey’s acceptance of Republic of Cyprus 
flagged vessels into Turkish ports, this modification of the Green Line 
regulation would mean that all of Cyprus as well as Turkey would be 
effective members of the EU customs union together. In the context of the 
debate on what kind of trade regime should govern Turkish Cypriot 
relations with the EU, prominent members in the Turkish Cypriot 
community, such as former president of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of 
Commerce Ali Erel, have long advocated the relative advantages of free 
trade over direct trade in Turkish-Cypriot-EU relations.  
4.2.2  Higher education 
Another controversial yet critical area to be worked on is that of higher 
education. Currently the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots is also felt in the 
domain of higher education, despite this being one of the most developed 
sectors in northern Cyprus. A strategic goal for universities in northern 
Cyprus is to join the emerging higher education area in the European 
Union and partake in ERASMUS, the European Community Action Scheme 
for the Mobility of University Students, as well as other ERASMUS-related 
programmes. Whereas mainland Turkish universities (hence students), and 
academic institutions in the Greek Cypriot community are part of the 
‘Bologna process’ that aims to create a European Higher Education Area by 
2010, Turkish Cypriot institutions remain excluded and face significant 
disadvantages.32   
                                                      
32 K. Rubin (2006), “Crossing the Green Line”, International Educator, Vol. 15, pp. 28-
35. CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 59 
 
The leaders, to date, have failed to find creative solutions to this 
problem, hindered by a good dose of insufficient political will. Yet Cypriots 
do not fundamentally disagree on the way forward (see Figure 31). In fact, 
both communities accept that ways should be found to integrate Turkish 
Cypriot higher education institutions in the European Higher Education 
system. This would allow for Turkish Cypriot participation in the Bologna 
Process, Erasmus Mundus, Leonardo and the EU’s Research Framework 
Programmes.33 At the same time, the two communities should also explore 
ways to create joint universities whereby Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots could work and study together.  
 
Figure 31. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to integrate 
Turkish Cypriot Higher Education Institutions into the European 
Higher Education System, while at the same time establishing common 
universities for the two communities in Cyprus 
Finding solutions to these issues is by no means impossible and need 
not get entangled in intractable issues of sovereignty and recognition. 
Under the 1960 framework issues such as culture and education were 
already foreseen as being separate communal competences. Implicit 
                                                      
33 This would entail going beyond the existing Commission scholarships to 
individual Turkish Cypriot students to study in the EU (while excluding Turkish 
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reference to the 1960 Constitution was precisely the way in which trade 
across the Green Line was agreed by both communities, given the 
establishment and status of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce in 
1960 which has, since 2004, been entitled by the EU to certify Turkish 
Cypriot products. Similar solutions could also be found in the field of 
higher education, adding to this the establishment of a joint university in 
order to make the deal more palatable to the Greek Cypriot community, 
who typically look more favourably on proposals that emphasise 
integration.  
By breaking the currently existing barriers to co-operation between 
academics of the two communities, and instead creating common 
institutions where advanced teaching and research can take place, an 
opportunity for significant societal transformation would be created; 
universities are the places where new polities, new norms and new 
attitudes are shaped. Thus, a higher education system that is at peace with 
the other community is an important precursor to a society and political 
system that is at peace with the other community. Additionally, it should 
be noted that currently in Cyprus almost all professional and even political 
groups (from businesses to the media, from trade unions to political 
parties) are legitimised to engage in contact with their counterparts in the 
other community, but academic institutions are excluded from this 
possibility – a situation that has more to do with the historical peculiarities 
of the Cyprus problem and less to do with any discernible policy of actual 
significance to any of the actors involved.  
4.2.3  Transitional justice 
Finally, within the context of negotiations over a comprehensive settlement, 
the two communities could also move forward on issues pertaining to 
transitional justice. One example that could obtain the consent of both 
communities, though admittedly by a narrow majority at this stage (52% 
GC and 58% TC), would be the establishment of an investigative committee 
to discover individuals who were responsible for acts of violence in the 
1963-74 period, offering immunity to those willing to cooperate with the 
authorities and genuinely willing to repent, while prosecuting others (see 
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Figure 32. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to establish 
a truth commission 
This would be essentially similar to the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission model.34 Moving forward on this dossier would 
probably only be possible in the framework of a comprehensive settlement 
in so far as it would require – far more than in the case of the joint fight 
against organised crime – an extremely deep level of police, intelligence 
and judicial cooperation between the parties. Yet within the process leading 
to a comprehensive settlement, joint work relating to information and 
intelligence-sharing could be carried out in preparation for the 
establishment of a just, accepted and effective system of transitional 
justice.35  
4.3  Preparing the ground for the most complex CBMs 
Finally, there are other important yet far more complex CBMs to be 
considered and worked upon. Given the contested nature of these issues, 
we would suggest that they be discussed within both communities in order 
to prepare the ground, in case these measures need to be revisited later on. 
                                                      
34 See E. Kaymak (2007), “Does Cyprus Need a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission?”, Cyprus Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, spring, pp. 71-89. 
35 On this see also ICG (2008), op. cit, p. 8. 62 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
However, in the current political context, these measures should probably 
not be the subject of formal negotiations between the leaders. Talks and 
efforts in these areas should by no means detract attention from the 
fundamental and within-reach goal of yielding a comprehensive 
agreement. In fact, within a comprehensive agreement, all these questions 
would automatically be resolved. Nonetheless given the critical importance 
of these issues and the uncertainty of a future comprehensive deal, we raise 
them here, recommending that at this stage, official, political and civil 
society actors engage in public discussion on these issues within each 
community, before tackling them in delicate and complex inter-communal 
discussion at leadership level.  
4.3.1  Direct trade and direct flights 
The first issue, of fundamental importance to Turkish Cypriots and by far 
the most acute symbol of their international isolation, is the question of 
direct trade and direct flights. The two issues are distinct and raise different 
problems.  
Turkish Cypriots can trade their goods directly to and from the EU 
and there are no legal impediments to them doing so. However, since the 
1994 European Court of Justice ruling on the Anastasiou case, the EU no 
longer allows preferential treatment of Turkish Cypriot certified products, 
and Turkish Cypriot exports to the EU have to pay standard import duties, 
making such exports highly uncompetitive.36 Following the Annan Plan 
debacle and UN General Secretary Kofi Annan’s call to lift the international 
isolation on Turkish Cypriots, the EU, one week before the RoC’s entry, 
proposed, alongside the ‘green line’ and the ‘financial aid’ regulation, a 
‘direct trade’ regulation. The proposed direct trade regulation would have 
allowed duty free import of EU goods into northern Cyprus and the duty 
free export of goods wholly obtained or substantially produced in the 
north. To overcome the problem of Turkish Cypriot origin certificates, the 
Commission proposed that certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot 
Chamber of Commerce be accepted. The argument advanced by the 
Commission was that the Chamber, an institution established under the 
                                                      
36 In 1994, the European Court of Justice judgement on the Anastasiou case 
prohibited preferential treatment for Cyprus exports that did not bear Republic of 
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1960 framework that predates the division of Cyprus, enjoys international 
standing. The Commission’s proposal included a tariff quota system, i.e., a 
system whereby only a specified quota of products could benefit from 
preferential trade. The quota was introduced to ensure that only Turkish 
Cypriot (rather than Turkish) products would benefit from the 
arrangement. Finally the Commission argued that the regime could be 
implemented under Article 133 of the EU Treaty, which regulates trade 
between the Community and third countries or territories that are part of a 
member state but not included in EU customs territory.  
The obstacles to implementation, both legal and political, have 
proved formidable, exemplifying the difficulties the EU has in acting 
decisively on Cyprus now that one party to the conflict is a member state. 
The Greek Cypriots, supported by the Council’s legal service, successfully 
argued that the directive required unanimity under Protocol 10 of the 
Accession Treaty rather than majority vote under Article 133.37 Having 
established its right to veto, the Greek Cypriot government has blocked all 
initiatives to approve and implement the regulation, insisting on its sole 
right to certify and verify origin of Cypriot exports, objecting to the use of 
Turkish Cypriot ports, and arguing that the regulation would lead to a 
creeping recognition of the TRNC. Despite successive efforts by the 
Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 2005, the British presidency in 
the second half of 2005, and the Finnish Presidency in the second half of 
2006, the direct trade regulation, to date, has been left pending.   
Direct air links are also of fundamental importance to Turkish 
Cypriots, representing a critical asset for the development of the tourist 
industry. As in the case of direct trade, the absence of direct air links is a 
principal feature of the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. The 
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation acknowledges each 
state’s “complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its 
territory” (Article 1). The RoC government, recognised by the UN as the 
sole legitimate state on the island, claims exclusive rights to designate 
which airports may be used. Unsurprisingly in the prevailing atmosphere, 
                                                      
37 They argued that the directive falls under Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty, 
which stipulates that a partial lifting of the suspension of the acquis to the north 
requires unanimity. The Commission has conceded the Greek Cypriot call for 
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it has not recognised northern airports and argues that operating direct 
flights to the north would be in breach of the Chicago Convention. The 
European Commission has indicated that it would not advance proposals 
on this issue. Interested member states like the UK have also been cautious 
in advancing ideas, arguing that the simplest solution would be for the 
Greek Cypriots to allow direct flights to Ercan airport in northern Cyprus.38 
However, also in this case, there appears to be little prospect for further 
movement on this front, despite its importance for the development of the 
north. 
As in the case of direct trade, direct air links are also related to the use 
of ports more generally. A case in point is the contested ferry line between 
Famagusta and Latakia. The Republic of Cyprus has maintained that the 
seaport is prohibited and closed to all vessels. The European Commission, 
on the other hand, has declared that “there is no prohibition under general 
international law to enter and leave seaports in the northern part of 
Cyprus”.39 The issue, however, remains unresolved and is the basis for 
mutual mistrust between the two sides on the island.   
Whereas Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly support movement on 
direct trade and direct flights, Greek Cypriots remain fundamentally 
opposed (64% GC against, 77% TC in favour). Yet given the critical 
importance of these issues for the development of the Turkish Cypriot 
economy, which the Greek Cypriots largely favour, it is of paramount 
importance for these issues to be debated openly and creatively in the 
south and for political and official actors to diffuse and repackage the 
divisive and polarising language used to discuss these issues in recent 
years. Naturally the question of trade and flights would be automatically 
resolved within the context of a comprehensive settlement currently being 
negotiated and as such engaging in direct negotiations on these issues now 
would be useless at best and counterproductive at worst. Yet lessons of the 
                                                      
38 See the “Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs on the Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2004-05 on 
Cyprus”, London, April 2005, p. 4. 
See “Commission legally endorses Famagusta-Latakia route”, Cyprus Observer, 19 
October 2007. 
39 See “Commission legally endorses Famagusta-Latakia route”, Cyprus Observer, 
19 October 2007 (http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/NewsDetails.aspx? 
id=2393). CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 65 
 
past also suggest that contingency planning is of the essence. In other 
words intra-societal debate, above all within the Greek Cypriot community 
on issues such as these are critical to provide a safety-net, not simply for the 
Turkish Cypriots but more broadly for the peace process and the future of 
EU-Turkey relations, should the current negotiating effort stall.  
Beyond the modification of the Green Line regulation allowing 
northern Cyprus to enter the EU customs union, which would de facto 
prove far more important for Turkish Cypriot trade than direct trade, 
movement is also necessary on the issue of direct flights. One suggestion 
that garners the consent of both communities (63% GC and 60% TC) would 
be the establishment of an airport to be made available for common use by 
Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and foreigners to travel to and from the 
rest of the world (see Figure 33). In other words, once the issue of flights is 
repackaged into the concept of ‘solving the flights issue in a manner that 
will at the same time put the two communities on a path of convergence’, 
the response of Greek Cypriots changes dramatically.  
 
Figure 33. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to make an 
airport available for common use by both communities 
While attractive in principle, the notion of a common airport begs the 
question of which airport could serve this purpose? Several options could 
be discussed. The oldest alternative is that of restoring the Nicosia 
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CBM package proposal by the UN. A second option would be some type of 
co-administration scheme for Ercan airport, including EU and/or UN 
administrative oversight, which would then be recognised by the RoC. A 
third alternative, which draws upon the UK’s readiness in 2004 to return 
part of the Dhekelia sovereign base area (SBA) to Cyprus as part of the 
Annan Plan, would be that of restoring and transforming the Dhekalia SBA 
into a civil international airport. 
4.3.2  Varosha 
The proposal of converting the Dhekelia SBA into an international airport 
for common use ties in with another critical element on both the CBM and 
the comprehensive settlement agenda: Varosha, the uninhabited and 
formerly developed tourist resort area bordering the town of Famagusta. 
Since the 1979 High Level agreement, the parties have accepted in principle 
the resettlement of the abandoned tourist resort area by Greek Cypriot 
displaced persons as an interim CBM. Since then, Varosha has been a 
permanent item on the CBM agenda, including in 1993 and again since the 
failed referenda in 2004. In 2005, the Turkish Cypriots made the surprising 
offer to return Varosha to the Greek Cypriots in exchange for the opening 
of the northern ports and Ercan airport. The Greek Cypriots rejected this 
out of hand, and negotiations collapsed. In 2006, the Greek Cypriots also 
pursued this route, proposing that the Turkish Cypriots returned Varosha 
to Greek Cypriot rule in return for the joint Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot 
management of Famagusta port. The Turkish Cypriots rejected the offer.  
The question of Varosha has also been complicated further by the fact 
that its status is governed by UNSC resolutions 550/1984 and 789/1992, 
requiring the consent of UNSC members in order to legalise a change in its 
status. Furthermore, our poll has shown that Varosha is another highly 
polarising issue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, with the 
idea to return Varosha to Greek Cypriots under RoC administration with 
UN security winning the overwhelming consent of the Greek Cypriots and 
the overwhelming opposition of the Turkish Cypriots (90% GC in favour, 
75% TC against).  
An alternative to these proposals, which, if approved would no doubt 
be accepted by the UNSC, would be that of transforming Varosha into a 
joint free trade area, a microcosm in which to experiment joint business 
ventures and the future of power-sharing on the island. This proposal, 
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asked whether they would accept the conversion of Varosha into a special 
zone of inter-communal cooperation under the supervision of the EU and 
the UN in which the challenges of power-sharing would be tried out in 
advance of a comprehensive solution, 62% of Greek Cypriots and 53% of 
Turkish Cypriots agreed (see Figure 34). Moving in this direction would 
also raise the appeal of transforming Dhekelia into an international airport 
serving the inter-communal zone of Varosha and northern Cyprus, while 
leaving Larnaca, in the south, to serve its current destinations.  
 
Figure 34. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to convert 
Varosha into a special zone of inter-communal co-operation 
The appeal of such an integrated proposal is to be found not so much 
in the current context of intensive negotiations for a comprehensive 
settlement (which after all, if successful would solve both the problem of 
Varosha and all matters related to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots), 
but rather as a complete ‘Plan B’ in case negotiations temporarily stall or 
prove to be more lengthy than anticipated. In such a scenario, this proposal 
could mitigate many of the negative side-effects that such a delay in 
reaching a Comprehensive Settlement would entail. For the two 
communities in Cyprus, it would provide a path of gradual convergence, 
especially on an everyday societal level, quietly leading to the building up 
of the required social capital for an eventual Comprehensive Settlement. 
For the Turkish Cypriots specifically, this would go a long way towards 
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towards the Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community; 
while for Turkey, and for the EU, the resolution of the Varosha and flights 
issues will remove the political impediments that currently prevent Turkey 
from fully implementing the Additional Protocol to the Customs Union 
that it signed after the 2004 accession of the 10 new member states. As a 
result, new life will be breathed into Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, 
which are currently moving at a very slow pace not least due to the 
impediments generated by the Cyprus impasse. In contrast, a total freezing 
of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations will benefit no one, least of all the 
Cypriots who are placing their hopes on an EU-oriented - and therefore 
solution oriented – Turkey. 
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Annex 1. Methodology 
The survey questionnaire (see Annex II) was designed by CEPS in 
collaboration with its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot project partners. 
The questionnaire was subsequently translated into Greek and Turkish, 
and the field work was administered by CYMAR Market Research40 in the 
Greek Cypriot Community and Prologue Consulting41 in the Turkish 
Cypriot Community. The field-work was conducted within a period of four 
weeks, from late April to late May 2008.   
 
For the Greek Cypriot Community:  
Methodology Report by CYMAR Market Research  
A. General public 
1. Coverage 
The survey was national and covered urban and rural populations. 
Greek-Cypriot males and females 18 years and over were eligible to 
participate in the study. 
2. Conduct method 
Interviews using a questionnaire (see Annex 2) were carried out face 
to face at the residence of respondents. 
3. Sample selection 
The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage 
area probability sampling and quotas sampling: the sample was selected in 
various stages as follows: 
Stage one: Stratification of the areas 
                                                      
40 CYMAR Market Research Ltd, established in 1994, is a Cyprus-based company 
specialising in market research. It operates primarily within the Greek Cypriot 
community. Cymar is a member of ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and 
Marketing Research) and SEDEAK (Cyprus Association of Opinion Poll and 
Market Research Enterprises) (see http://www.cymar.com.cy). 
41 Established in 2002, Prologue Consulting Ltd is a market research and consulting 
company based in the northern part of Cyprus. Prologue is a member of ESOMAR 
(European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research) (for more information, see 
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Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban 
and rural on the basis of the latest 2001 Population Census, carried out by the 
Department of Statistical Services of the Republic of Cyprus.  
Stage two: Selection of PSUS (Primary Sampling Units) 
For the purposes of sample selection, urban areas in each district 
were divided into a number of enumeration areas of approximately the 
same size (~1000 persons each). 
The greater urban area of Nicosia was divided into 209 enumeration 
areas, of Limassol into 161, Larnaka into 72 and Pafos into 45. 
For the sample selection, the enumeration areas in urban districts and 
the villages in rural areas were treated as primary sampling units.  
In each district, urban enumeration areas had an equal probability of 
being chosen as primary sampling units. By contrast, rural enumeration 
areas (villages) had a probability of being selected that was proportionate 
to their size. 
In total, 68 enumeration areas in urban areas and 32 villages in rural 
areas were randomly selected.  
Each area selected was allocated an equal number of interviews.  
The distribution of the primary sampling units selected among the 
five districts and among urban and rural areas within each district was 
representative of the actual population. 
Stage three:  Selection of households 
Within each Primary Sampling Unit selected at stage two an equal 
number of households was selected in such a way that each household was 
given, as far as possible, an equal probability of selection.  
In the selected area the interviewer was allocated a random starting 
point,42 from which he/she commenced calling on every nth household 
encountered.  
Stage four:  Selection of individuals 
In each household selected at stage three, one person was selected 
based on predefined quotas. Quotas were set with respect to sex and age in 
order to ensure that the selected sample was representative of the target 
population of the survey.  
                                                      
42 Both enumeration areas and starting points were randomly selected with the aid 
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4. Sample size 
In total 1000 interviews were carried out. 
5. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.  
6. Training and control of the interviewers 
All interviewers who participated in the study have previous 
experience with social research, and have all completed their education, at 
least to secondary level.  
Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers 
went through a 3-day training stage before fieldwork commenced.  
During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were 
fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written 
instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample 
selection, how to approach people and the point of the questionnaire.  
In total, 30 interviewers and 4 supervisors worked on the study.  
The interviewers delivered their work to the supervisors on a daily 
basis and the supervisors were responsible for the daily checking of the 
completed questionnaires. There was a 15% recall of the work of each 
interviewer to make sure of the authenticity of the responses, the time the 
interview took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was 
supervised by the manager in charge of the project.  
B. Decision-makers 
The second target population of the survey was decision-makers (current 
and former members of parliament, ministers, mayors, elected officials, 
political party members, etc). 
For the purpose of sample selection a list of 139 decision-makers was 
compiled by CYMAR from various sources.  
All individuals on the list were initially contacted by telephone. 
During this initial contact the purpose of the study was explained to 
potential interviewees and their level of interest and willingness to 
participate in the study was assessed.  
A meeting was arranged with all individuals who agreed to 
participate in the survey in order to conduct the interview. In total, 76 
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For the Turkish Cypriot Community:  
Methodology Report by Prologue Consulting 
A. General public 
1. Coverage 
The survey in the Turkish Cypriot Community was national and 
covered urban and rural areas. Turkish-Cypriots males and females of 18 
years and over were eligible to participate in the study. 
2. Conduct method 
Interviews were carried out face-to-face at the residence of 
respondents. 
3. Sample selection 
The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage 
area probability sampling and quotas sampling: The sample was selected in 
various stages as follows: 
Stage one: Stratification of the areas 
Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban 
and rural on the basis of the latest Census, carried out by the Department of 
Statistical Services and the 5 districts were allocated quotas according to the 
natural distribution of the population.    
Stage two:  Selection of individuals 
The individuals to be surveyed have been selected using a specifically 
designed computer programme using preselected quotas.  Quotas were set 
with respect to sex and age in order to ensure that the selected sample was 
representative of the target population of the survey.  
4. Sample size 
In total 1000 interviews were carried out. 
5. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.  
6. Training and control of the interviewers 
All interviewers who participated in the study had previous 
experience with social research, and have all completed their education, at 
least to secondary level.  
Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers 
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During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were 
fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written 
instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample 
selection, how to approach people and the point of the questionnaire.  
For the purposes of study, 40 interviewers were used.  
There was a recall of 25% of the work selected at random in order to 
make certain of the authenticity of the responses, the time the interview 
took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was 
supervised by the manager in charge of the project.  
B. Decision-makers 
The second target population of the survey was decision-makers (current 
and former members of parliament, ministers, mayors, elected officials, 
political party members, etc). 
For the purpose of sample selection a list of 100 decision-makers was 
compiled from various sources by Prologue Consulting Ltd.  
All individuals on the list were initially contacted by telephone. 
During this initial contact the purpose of the study was explained to 
potential interviewees and their level of interest and willingness to 
participate in the study was assessed.  
A meeting was arranged with all individuals who agreed to 
participate in the survey in order to conduct the interview. In total, 25 
successful interviews were conducted with decision-makers.  
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Annex 2. CEPS Survey No. 1, pre-translation template questionnaire 
The following questionnaire was devised as a template within CEPS, 
Brussels, before being translated into Greek and Turkish and used for the 
survey interviews in both communities. In designing the substantive 
questions (see Section A and Section B below), every effort was made to 
include the viewpoints of both communities, and of other involved actors, 
as these have been made public at various times through the media, 
published documents related to the Cyprus negotiations and prior policy 
research publications. In designing the values questions (see Section C and 
Section D below), material was utilised from the World Values Survey43 in 
order to allow for future comparisons of our findings with World Values 
Survey results for Turkey, Greece, and other European countries or 
countries in conflict. Regarding the more Cyprus-specific aspects of the 
values section, additional material was utilised from a recent survey 
concerning inter-group contact in Cyprus, conducted by the Oxford Centre 
for the Study of Intergroup Conflict.44 
 
Section A – The way towards a Cyprus Settlement 
A1. On 21 March this year, the leaders of the two communities Demetris 
Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, agreed to set up technical committees 
and working groups as a first stage towards negotiating a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus Problem. To what extent are you hopeful that this 
agreement will produce results? (0 to 10 scale, from “no hope at all” to 
“great hope”)  
 
A2. More specifically, the technical committees will consider possible 
confidence-building measures and other matters that affect the daily lives 
of the two communities, to be implemented even before a settlement is 
reached. To what extent would you agree or disagree, if these technical 
committees were to explore the following issues? (5 point scale) 
                                                      
43 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
44 C. Psaltis and M. Hewstone (2008), Intergroup contact between Greek-Cypriots and 
Turkish-Cypriots, Final Report of the New Career Development Scheme Fellowship, 
of Nuffield Foundation at the Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict, 
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1.  Find ways so that the organised crime that is operating across the 
buffer zone is stopped, in a three-way co-operation between the 
Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and the United Nations. 
2.  Find ways so that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots participate 
together, in upcoming international sporting events such as the 
Olympic Games. 
3.  Examine ways for the Turkish Cypriots to also adopt the euro 
(common European currency), as the Greek Cypriots already did in 
January 2008. 
4.  Examine ways in which each community can protect that part of its 
cultural heritage that happens to be under the control of the other 
side, through the mediation of the United Nations and the 
International Community. 
5.  Find ways to enhance the economic ties between the two 
communities even before a solution, such as through trade and 
common enterprises. 
6.  Find ways to integrate Turkish Cypriot higher education institutions 
into the European Higher Education system, while at the same time 
exploring the possibility of establishing common universities where 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot academics will work together on various 
issues. 
7.  Find ways to impose a moratorium on any further building over 
Turkish Cypriot properties in the south and Greek Cypriot properties 
in the north, while a comprehensive solution is negotiated. 
8.  Find mutually acceptable ways for goods produced by the Turkish 
Cypriots to be exported to all EU countries without paying third-
country import levies.   
9.  Find ways to allow direct trade and direct flights, from ports and 
airports in the north of Cyprus to the rest of the world. 
10.  Find mutually acceptable ways for Varosha to be converted to a 
special zone of inter-communal cooperation, under the supervision of 
the UN and the EU, as an area where the challenges of power-sharing 
will be tested in advance of a comprehensive settlement. 
11.  Find a mutually acceptable way for an airport to be made available 
for common use, both by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to 
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12.  Find a way to return Varosha to its pre-1974 Greek Cypriot owners, 
under the administrative control of the Republic of Cyprus but with 
the UN being temporarily responsible for the town’s security.  
13.  Form an investigative committee to discover which individuals were 
responsible for acts of violence against the other community in events 
from 1963 to 1974, offering immunity from prosecution if they are 
willing to co-operate and admit what they did, but prosecuting them 
if they are unrepentant and unwilling to co-operate.  
14.  Form a Social Reconciliation Committee that will focus on examining 
the current state of suspicion and mistrust between Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots, discover what causes it, and suggest ways in 
which it can be overcome. 
15.  Examine ways to renovate the old buildings in the buffer zone, near 
the Ledra Street crossing in Nicosia, so that the area can then be used 
by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots together, to meet and 
engage in various shared activities. 
16.  Find mutually acceptable ways to bring Turkish Cypriot society, 
institutions and norms closer to the European Union’s norms and 
regulations, so that Turkish Cypriots will be ready to become an 
active part of the EU as soon as the Cyprus problem is solved. 
 
A3. Now, regarding the search for an actual Comprehensive Settlement, if 
negotiations commence again what do you think should be their basis? 
(Unacceptable, Tolerable if we do not have better options, Satisfactory on 
the whole, Highly desirable) 
1.  The basis should be allowed to develop through a fresh and creative 
discussion and negotiation of the various substantive issues, with 
reference to what the people of both communities might be willing to 
accept. 
2.  The Annan Plan should be used as the basis of all further discussion 
and negotiations. 
3.  The basis of negotiations should be the 1960 constitution. 
4.  The two sides should first recognise each other as legal states, and 
this should be a basis and precondition for any further negotiations. 
5.  The basis for negotiations should be the principles of a bi-zonal and 
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A4. And when negotiations commence again, who do you believe should 
be primarily involved, on an expert level, in drafting its legal and 
administrative provisions? (Choose only one) 
1.  Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot experts working together 
2.  UN-appointed experts from third countries 
3.  It doesn’t really matter where the experts come from. 
 
Section B – Substantive aspects of a Comprehensive Settlement 
 
The basic response range for each question is as follows: 
1 – This is entirely unacceptable 
2 – This is tolerable if necessary 
3 – This is satisfactory on the whole 
4 – This is highly desirable 
5 – This is absolutely essential 
 
Additional response options are as follows: 
77 – I am not sure where I stand regarding this proposal 
88 – I do not understand the implications of this proposal 
99 – I do not wish to respond (Unprompted) 
 
B1. Overall Shape of the deal 
1.  The overall deal could be described as a “bi-zonal bi-communal 
federation with political equality”. This would mean that there 
would be one central federal government, but also two regional 
administrations. In the federal government, the two communities 
would work together to manage matters of common concern, while 
through the regional administrations each community would look 
after its own affairs. 
2.  The overall deal could be described as a “confederation of two 
sovereign states”. The fundamental right of self determination would 
first be acknowledged to each of the two sides, who would then come 
together in a loose partnership, giving over some of their authorities 
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3.  The overall deal could be described as a “land for recognition” 
package. The Turkish Cypriots will give over land to the Greek 
Cypriots, somewhat more than they would give under a federal or 
confederal solution, and in return the Greek Cypriots will recognise 
the TRNC, which will become a sovereign and internationally-
recognised state with a seat at the UN and the right to apply for EU 
membership. 
4.  The overall deal could be described as an “evolutionary integration 
into a unified state”.  Initially, the agreed settlement will involve the 
setting up of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation, with each 
community mostly living in its own region and managing its own 
affairs, but gradually the various restrictions will be lifted allowing 
for a total mixing of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot 
population, with the ultimate aim of removing ethnic distinctions 
from politics and creating a state where all citizens are equal before 
the law. 
 
B2. Property 
1.  In order to reach a satisfactory solution to the property issue, the 
affected individuals themselves - the ordinary Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot refugees - need to be consulted so that the solution 
will be tailor-made to their real requirements. 
2.  The property issue should be solved primarily through restitution, so 
that affected individuals will regain control of their properties as they 
had them before the events of the Cyprus Problem. 
3.  The international community – including Turkey and Greece – 
should contribute generously to the financial cost involved in the 
resolution of the property issue. 
4.  The property issue should be solved primarily through 
compensation, rather than through restitution, and with the absolute 
minimum relocation and resettlement of individuals from their post-
1974 residences. 
5.  Before the property issue can be resolved, a full census of all affected 
properties should take place, in both communities, examining their 
current use and condition. This property census would then be used 
by the negotiators of the two communities in their deliberations. 
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B3. Security – Guarantees 
1.  In order to reach a satisfactory solution to the security aspect, the 
security concerns and fears of both communities need to be taken into 
account as well as the objective threats that Cyprus might face in the 
future. 
2.  Post-settlement Cyprus will need to maintain a moderately-sized 
professional security force, bi-communal in composition, which 
would be responsible for defending the island from any internal and 
external threats. 
3.  After the settlement, Cyprus should be fully demilitarised. All foreign 
troops should withdraw and all Cypriot armies should be disbanded. 
4.  After the settlement, the constitutional order and territorial integrity 
of Cyprus should be guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
B4. Governance – Power-sharing 
1.  The administrative provisions of the settlement must be such as to 
ensure the functionality of government, and specifically to ensure 
that the government will be able to make swift and correct decisions.  
2.  Effective participation both of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
in the decision-making process should be included in the 
administrative provisions of the settlement.  
3.  Each community should have the right to unilaterally block any 
decision or legislation of the federal government which it considers to 
be incompatible with its own communal interests.  
4.  The electoral system must be such as to ensure that politicians – 
whether Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot – will need to solicit the 
votes of people from both communities, and in this way consider 
themselves accountable to both communities.  
 
B5. Human Rights – Bi-zonality 
1.  A balanced compromise will need to be struck between the desire of 
Greek Cypriots to be able to live freely anywhere in post-settlement 
Cyprus, and the desire of Turkish Cypriots to ensure that they will 
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2.  In the context of a settlement, all, or almost all of the Greek Cypriots 
should live in the Greek Cypriot state, while all or almost all of the 
Turkish Cypriots should live in the Turkish Cypriot state. 
3.  In the context of a settlement, all citizens of Cyprus should have the 
right to live, work, and claim their rights as citizens, anywhere within 
the territory of Cyprus. 
4.  Even within the wider framework of a bi-zonal settlement, it will be 
important to ensure that mixed local communities develop again, as 
they existed prior to 1974, in order to bring the two communities 
closer to each other on a day-to-day level after all these years of 
separation. 
 
B6. Citizenship 
1.  People from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many 
decades with their families should, after a settlement, be allowed to 
stay, but those who came more recently should return to Turkey. 
2.  Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, 
but only with a residence permit and work permit – not with 
citizenship and voting rights. 
3.  All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their 
descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only 
possible exception is the case of those who have married Turkish 
Cypriots and the children of such mixed marriages. 
4.  In order to properly resolve the issue of the people from Turkey, a 
complete and internationally monitored population census must first 
take place, in both communities, so that the negotiators have a clear 
picture of the extent and parameters of the problem they are trying to 
solve. 
 
B7. Economics 
1.  Immediately after the settlement, every effort must be made to bring 
the standard of living of the Turkish Cypriots on a par with the 
standard of living of Greek Cypriots, but financed in such a way as 
not to burden the Greek Cypriots. 
2.  Economic integration needs to take place at a moderate pace, with 
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vulnerable economic groups (low-skilled workers, small businesses 
etc.) from competition they are not ready to face. 
3.  The settlement should include a complete economic development plan, 
which will outline the strategy for economic progress and growth in 
the first few years after a settlement for the benefit of all economic 
groups in society. 
4.  In the settlement, joint business ventures between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots should be encouraged through appropriate incentive 
schemes as a way to improve the relations between the two 
communities and encourage economic growth. 
5.  The financial and economic ramifications of the settlement must be 
evaluated very carefully by experts in advance of the agreement, in 
order to ensure that there will not be any unexpected negative 
consequences. 
 
B8. International Outlook  
1.  After a settlement, unified Cyprus must enjoy relations of sovereign 
equality with Greece and Turkey, and not be seen as in any way 
inferior or subordinate to them. 
2.  Once a settlement is reached, and given that all parties – Greek 
Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and Greece – are honouring their 
part of the agreement, unified Cyprus should support Turkey’s bid 
for EU membership. 
3.  Greece, Turkey and unified Cyprus should become strategic partners 
after a settlement, working together to promote the stability and 
development of other countries in the Balkans and the Middle East. 
4.  After a settlement, regional headquarters of the UN, the EU and other 
international organisations should be located in unified Cyprus, 
making use of the island’s ‘between three continents’ strategic 
location. 
5.  After a settlement, unified Cyprus should participate fully in the 
development and execution of the European Union’s common 
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Section C – Attitudes regarding inter-communal relations in Cyprus 
C1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements regarding the other community in Cyprus and prospects for a 
solution? (5 point Scale) 
1.  We have much in common with the Turkish Cypriots (Greek 
Cypriots). 
2.  I would not mind having Turkish Cypriot (Greek Cypriot) 
neighbours. 
3.  The Cyprus Problem must be solved on the basis of a mutually 
acceptable compromise. 
4.  The Cyprus Problem must be solved through an armed struggle. 
5.  I do not waste my time listening to the arguments of Turkish 
Cypriots (Greek Cypriots). 
6.  I recognise that both communities of Cyprus have made mistakes 
in the past. 
7.  I try to look at the Cyprus problem, both from the point of view of 
Greek Cypriots (Turkish Cypriots) and from the point of view of 
Turkish Cypriots (Greek Cypriots). 
 
C2. For each of the persons and groups below, to what extent would you 
say you trust their intentions? (Strongly mistrust, somewhat mistrust, 
somewhat trust, strongly trust) 
1.  The Turkish Cypriot Leader, Mr. Talat/The Greek Cypriot 
Leader, Mr. Christofias 
2.  The Turkish Government/The Greek Cypriot National Council 
3.  The Turkish Army/The Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus 
4.  Turkish Cypriot Left-Wing Parties/AKEL Party 
5.  Turkish Cypriot Right-Wing Parties/DISY Party (Clerides Party) 
6.  Ordinary Turkish Cypriots/Ordinary Greek Cypriots. 
 
C3. And of the above, who do you think will be primarily involved in 
making the important decisions related to the Cyprus Problem? (Up to two 
answers only) 
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C4. Do you consider yourself to be ... (One answer only) 
1.  Only a Greek (Turk) and not at all a Cypriot? 
2.  Mostly a Greek (Turk) but also somewhat a Cypriot? 
3.  A Greek (Turk) and a Cypriot to the same degree? 
4.  Mostly a Cypriot but also somewhat a Greek (Turk)? 
5.  Only a Cypriot and not at all a Greek (Turk)?  
 
C5. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements regarding national and cultural identity? (5 point scale) 
1.  I consider myself to have Greek (Turkish) cultural roots. 
2.  Cyprus historically is Hellenic (Turkish). 
3.  Entrance into the European Union constitutes a threat to our 
national identity. 
4.  I consider Greece (Turkey) to be my mother country. 
 
C6. How satisfied are you with the political situation related to the Cyprus 
Problem, as it stands today? (Scale 0 to 10) 
 
Section D – Personal, Social and Political Values 
 
D1. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at 
home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please 
choose up to five! 
1.  Independence 
2.  Feeling of responsibility  
3.  Imagination and Creativity  
4.  Tolerance and respect for other people  
5.  Determination, perseverance  
6.  Religious faith  
7.  Not being selfish 
8.  Obedience. 
 
D2. Now I will briefly describe some people. Would you please indicate for 
each description whether that person is much like you, somewhat like you, 86 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
a little like you, or not at all like you? (Code one answer for each 
description) 
1.  It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be 
creative; to do things one’s own way. 
2.  It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and 
expensive things. 
3.  Living in secure surroundings is important to this person to avoid 
anything that might be dangerous. 
4.  It is important to this person to have a good time; to ‘spoil’ 
oneself. 
5.  It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for 
their well-being. 
6.  Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have 
an exciting life. 
7.  Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs 
handed down by the previous generation.  
 
D3. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be 
for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which 
people would give top priority. Would you please say which two of these 
you, yourself, consider the most important? (Code two choices) 
1.  A high level of economic growth  
2.  Making sure this country has strong defence forces  
3.  Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at 
their jobs and in their communities 
4.  Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. 
 
D4. If you had to choose, which two of the things on this card would you 
say is most important? (Code two choices) 
1.  Maintaining order in the nation  
2.  Giving people more say in important government decisions  
3.  Fighting rising prices  
4.  Protecting freedom of speech. 
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D5. Here is another list. In your opinion, which two of these are most 
important? (Code two choices)  
1.  A stable economy 
2.  Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society  
3.  Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money  
4.  The fight against crime. 
 
D6. I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what 
you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, 
would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of 
governing this country? (Read out and code one answer for each) 
1.  Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with 
parliament and elections 
2.  Having experts, not politicians, make decisions according to what 
they think is best for the country 
3.  Having the army take over when government is incompetent 
4.  Having a democratic political system. 
 
D7. In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right.’ How would 
you locate yourself on a left-right spectrum as below? 
1.  Far left 
2.  Left 
3.  Centre left 
4.  Centrist 
5.  Centre right 
6.  Right 
7.  Far right. 
 
D8. And how would you describe yourself in terms of religion? 
1.  I don’t believe in God. 
2.  I believe in God generally and I try to be a good person, but 
without believing in any particular religion. 
3.  I consider myself an Orthodox Christian (Muslim) but I don’t 
follow the rituals of religion very much. 
4.  I consider myself a practising Orthodox Christian (Muslim) and 
try to follow the dictates of religion as best I can. 88 | KAYMAK, LORDOS & TOCCI 
 
D9. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Please show your response on 
this card, where 0 means that “people would try to take advantage of you,” 
and 10 means that “people would try to be fair” (Code one number). 
 
D10. I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. 
Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group 
completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? (Read out and code one 
answer for each) 
1.  Your family  
2.  Your neighbourhood  
3.  People you know personally 
4.  People you meet for the first time 
5.  People of another religion  
6.  People of another nationality. 
 
D11. I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could 
you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at 
all? (Code one answer for each) 
1.  The church/religious authorities 
2.  The armed forces  
3.  The police 
4.  The courts 
5.  The government  
6.  Political parties  
7.  Parliament 
8.  The European Union 
9.  The United Nations. 
 
D12. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to 
the world. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements about how you see yourself? (5 point 
scale) 
1.  I see myself as a world citizen 
2.  I see myself as a citizen of my country 
3.  I see myself as a citizen of the European Union. CYPRUS: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PEACE | 89 
 
D13. Turning to the question of ethnic diversity, with which of the 
following views do you agree? Please use a 0 to 10 scale to indicate your 
position (Code one number): 
•  Ethnic diversity erodes a country’s unity 
•  Ethnic diversity enriches life. 
 
D14. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely 
dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would 
you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole? (Code one number). 
 
E. Demographics 
E1. Year of birth 
E2. Age group 
E3. Gender 
E4. Place of residence 
E5. District 
E6. Urban/rural 
E7. Level of education 
E8. Family income 
E9. Refugee status 
E10. Ethnic origin 
E11. Profession 
E12. Newspaper readership 
E13. Vote in 2004 referendum 
E14. Vote in most recent parliamentary elections 
E15. Interviewee attention span/quality of interview. 
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